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The Pursuit of Pluralism: 
Lessons from the New 
French Audiovisual 
Communications Law 
by MICHAEL MEYERSON* 
Electronic mass communications, which have become increas-
ingly influential over the past quarter century, have also undergone 
rapid and profound technological change. Constitutional govern-
ments around the world have struggled to apply their fundamental 
legal principles to the electronic media through sensible and bal-
anced regulation. Perhaps the central problem in such regulation is 
to protect truth in the media, mainly by encouraging diversity, with-
out allowing the regulators themselves to exert undue influence over 
what is disseminated over the airwaves and cables of a country's 
communications infrastructure. The following article traces the his-
tory of France's attempts to solve this problem in its electronic media 
law, analyzes the most recent reform of French law and suggests 
some possibilities for applying the lessons of the French experience to 
U. S. regulation of electronic media. 
The relationship between government and electronic mass 
communications is inevitably difficult and complex. Government 
must carefully balance its goal of maximizing the social benefits 
from scarce public resources, whether they are the ainvaves 
which carry broadcast signals or the city streets where cable 
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television lines are laid, against the continual threat of govern-
ment influence, or even control, of an important means of 
communication. 1 
France has long struggled with this dilemma. On July 29, 
1982, France enacted a major reform of its communication law 
for the fifth time in less than a quarter century.2 The goal of the 
1982 reform was to "reinvent" the law of communications and 
replace the historical government monopoly of radio and televi-
sion with pluralism and private access to the electronic media.3 
The new law has proved only partly successful. Diverse pri-
vate communications have flourished in radio, but other elec-
tronic media remain under government domination.4 The 
announced state plans for cable television do not remove the risk 
of undue influence by both the national and local governments.5 
It is especially important that Americans understand both the 
problems and potential of the new French law, as well as the al-
ternative proposals which ultimately were rejected by the French 
Parliament. Of course, there are many important historical and 
cultural differences between the U.S. and France and their regu-
lation of communications. The French began their reform from a 
position of government dominance over the electronic media, 
while the United States' tradition of the private journalist perme-
ates its broadcasting: "We must necessarily rely in large part 
upon the editorial initiative and judgment of the broadcasters 
who bear the public trust."6 
Nevertheless, because of its government's involvement in 
electronic mass communications, the U.S. faces issues similar to 
those confronted by the French. Federal licensing and regula-
tion of broadcasters and state and local franchising of cable tele-
vision operators are intended to foster diversity and the public 
1 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367 (1969); CBS v. Dem-
ocratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Community Communications Co. v. 
City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982). 
2 Law No. 82-562 of July 29, 1982, 1982 Journal Officiel de la Republique Fran-
caise u.O.] 2431, 1982 Juris-classeur periodique U.C.P.] III No. 53048. See also Law No. 
74-696 of August 7, 1974, 1974J.0. 8355, 1974 Dalloz-Sirey, Legislation [D.S.L.] 270; 
Law No. 72-553 of July 3, 1972, 1972J.0. 6851, 1972 D.S.L. 329; Law No. 64-621 of 
June 27, 1964, 1964J.0. 5636; Decree No. 59-273 of February 4, 1959, 1959 J.O. 1859. 
3 Institut National de La Communication AudiovisueLle et Correspondence Municipale, La 
BataiLle du Cable (1983) (hereinafter cited as La BataiLle du Cable). See infra text accompa-
nying.notes 192-202. 
4 See infra text accompanying notes 310-327. 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 328-346. 
6 F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of California, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3117 (1984). 
See also CBS v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 124-27. 
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interest.7 Government regulators are limited, though, by the 
fundamental principle that "the First Amendment forbids the 
government from regulating speech in ways that favor some 
viewpoints at the expense of others."8 
The purpose of this article is to analyze the French law of 
communications in order to understand more fully the need for, 
and dangers of, government regulation of the electronic mass 
media. First, an examination of the history of French communi-
cations law, from the first broadcasting law in 1923 through the 
most recent reforms of 1982, builds a framework for evaluating 
current law by exploring the development of the government 
monopoly. Next, the most recent law is analyzed. This study of 
the proposed reforms, the actual language as enacted and the 
practical results of the law, reveals those ideas which work, the 
innovative proposals which were lost in the political process and 
the false "reforms" which simply maintained the status quo. Fi-
nally, some of the "lessons" of the 1982 law are applied to Amer-
ican communications law. The dual, and occasionally conflicting, 
First Amendment interests of ensuring the widest diversity of 
speakers while preventing governmental influence in the market-
place of ideas are reexamined in light of the French experience. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A. Freedom of the Press in France 
The history of government control of radio and television in 
France mirrors to some extent the longer history of French gov-
ernment involvement with the press in general. The Declaration 
of the Rights of Man,9 written in 1789, established freedom of 
opinion 10 and of communications, 11 but placed limitations on 
7 E.g., National Broadcasting Company v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,227 (1943); 
Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island v. Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 986 (D.R.I. 1983), 
appeal filed, no. 83-1800 (lst Cir. 1983). 
8 F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of California, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 3135 n.6 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). See also Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) 
("[T]he First Amendment means as a general matter that government has no power to 
restrict expression because of its mesage, its idea, its subject matter or its content.") 
9 DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CmZEN OF AUGUST 26, 1789 
(franslated by H. deVries, N. Galston & R. Laening, French Law 2-3 (1982) [hereinafter 
cited as "French Law"]. The Preamble to the Constitution of October 4, 1958 specifically 
refers to the Declaration of the Rights of Man: "The French people hereby solemnly 
proclaim their attachment to the Rights of Man and the principles of national sover-
eignty as defined by the Declaration of 1789 .... " (translated in French Law at 2-9). It 
is, therefore, still binding on the French government. See Neuborne,Judicial Review and 
Separation of Power in France and the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 363, 380 n.60 (1982). 
10 DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN art. X. 
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both. Article 10 prohibited punishment for opinions "provided 
their expression [did] not disturb the public order."12 The right 
to "speak, write and publish freely," granted by article 11, was 
constrained by the proviso that every citizen "shall be liable for 
the abuse of this freedom in such cases as are determined by 
law."13 
Government censorship and control of the press continued, 
with occasional periods of relative freedom, throughout most of 
the nineteenth century.14 Finally, in 1881, a major law on the 
rights of the press was enacted.15 Article 1 of the law declared: 
"Press and publishing are free."16 Newspapers no longer needed 
government authorization to print, and direct control of the 
press was restricted. 17 The press, however, was far from free of 
government interference. Seizure of newspapers by the govern-
ment "in order to maintain or reestablish the public order" re-
mained legal. 18 
The relationship of the government to the press remains un-
easy. Legislation to limit the number of newspapers controlled 
by one person,19 proposed in 1983 by the socialist Mitterand 
government, appears to be aimed more at limiting the influence 
II Id. at art. XI. 
12 "No one may be harassed because of his opinions, even his religious opinions, 
provided their expression does not disturb the public order established by law." Id. at 
art. X. 
13 "The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious 
rights of man; every citizen may therefore speak, write, and publish freely, provided he 
shall be liable for the abuse of this freedom in such cases as are determined by law." !d. 
at Art. XI. The government remained free to punish expression which it disapproved. 
Thus, the Constitution of 1791 outlawed the defamation of the "integrity" of public 
officers, and a law enacted in 1796 authorized the death penalty for those promoting a 
form of government other than that established by the Constitution. F. CASTBERG, FREE-
DOM OF SPEECH IN THE WEST 14-15 (1960). 
14 CASTBERG, supra note 13, at 16-21. 
15 Law of July 29, 1881, Bull. off. 637, No. 10,850, 1882 Recueil Sirey, Lois Annotees 
1. 
16 Id. 
17 See C. COLLIARD, LIBERTES PUBLIQ.UES 455 (5th ed. 1975). 
18 Art. 24 of the Law of July 29,1881. See C. COLLIARD, supra note 17, at 459; F. 
CASTBERG, supra note 13, at 22. Newspapers which attacked the President of the Repub-
lic were seized in 1909, and those which threatened national security were seized before 
the start of the Second World War. C. COLLIARD, supra note 17, at 460. As recently as 
1956-57, there were widespread seizures of books, periodicals and newspapers report-
ing on the Algerian crisis. !d. See also F. CASTBERG, supra note 13, at 79 ("Most fre-
quently the seizures are carried out because the newspapers involved give information 
about the actions and repressive measures taken by the French armed forces in Algeria, 
in a way which the authorities find defamatory and detrimental to the armed forces of 
the country.") 
19 Nothing to Lose but its Chains, The Economist, Dec. 24, 1983, at 43-44; France Un-
veils Plan to Limit Ownership of Newspapers, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1983, at A22, col. 3. 
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of a particular conservative publisher20 than at promoting the 
stated objective of protecting pluralism in the press.21 
B. Broadcasting and the State 
Regardless of the ties between the French government and 
the print media, the integration of government and broadcasting 
has increased immeasurably. At the center of this link is the doc-
trine that radio and television constitute a "public service."22 
The public service concept governs activities of such importance 
to the general welfare that they must either be undertaken by the 
government itself or by private parties subject to vigorous gov-
ernment oversight.23 Broadcast communications in particular 
are seen as having the power to turn viewers and listeners into 
either "educated citizens of the world" or "conditioned sub-
jects."24 As President Georges Pompidou declared in 1972: 
"Whether one likes it or not, television is regarded as the Voice 
of France both by the people of France and abroad."25 Accord-
ingly, the government supervises "all information in the name of 
the collective interest."26 
Public services traditionally are performed by a state monop-
01y.27 Such a monopoly is considered especially appropriate for 
broadcasting because of the physical limitations of the radio 
Under the proposed law, no person could own either two national newspapers or one 
regional and one national newspaper. 
20 Nothing to Lose but its Chains, supra note 19, at 44. 
21 France Unveils Plan to Limit Ownership of Newspapers, supra note 19. 
22 See e.g., Kerever, French Broadcasting Law, in INTERNATIONAL LITERARY AND ARTIS-
TIC ASSOCIATION, CABLE TELEVISION-MEDIA AND COPYRIGHT LAw ASPECTS 66 (1983). 
23 [d. at 66. 
24 Bouissou, Le State de L'Office de Radiodiffusion-Television Francaise (ORTF), 80 R.D.P. 
1169, 1173 (1964). See also, Missika & Wolton, au Va La Television, Le Monde, Feb. 26, 
1982, at 1 (French television is "an important instrument of cultural promotion."). Ra-
dio and television are perceived as being far more powerful than the written press be-
cause of the size of the audience, make-up of the audience (particularly the large' 
percentage of children), the speed of transmission (which inhibits "reflection") and in; 
the case of television, the emotive power of pictures. 
25 Tarle, France: The Monopoly That Won't Divide in TELEVISION AND POLITICAL LIn; 
23 (A. Smith ed. 1979). Traditionally, most Frenchmen agreed that radio and television 
were a "government affair." Morand & Valter, Efficacite de Gestion et Liberte d'Expression.4 
La Radiodiffusion-Television Francaise, 92 REVUE DU DROIT PuBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POL~ 
TIQ.UE EN FRANCE ET A L'ETRANGER [R.D.P.] 5, 60 (1976). 
26 Chevalier, Le Statut de la Communication .4udiovisuelle, 10 ACTUALITES JURIDIQ.U~ 
DROIT ADMINISTRATIF (AJ.D.A.) 555 (Oct. 20, 1982). See Bouissou, supra note 24,&1 
1194-95 (The Minister of Information announced in 1963 that the consequences of the 
"audiovisual revolution ... are too large for the State to lose interest."). 
27 See Kerever, supra note 22, at 66. 
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spectrum.28 While the state can "share" its monopoly of a public 
service with private parties,29 such sharing has begun only re-
cently in radio,30 and is virtually non-existent in television.31 
Many believe that the government's control over broadcasting is 
essential to its retention of political control. 32 Some have feared 
that private control of the limited resource of the airwaves would 
lead to a private monopoly. 33 This would create undesirable cor-
porate power,34 and economic pressure to "please at any price" 
would lead to "simplicity and sensationalism, if not vulgarity."35 
A related justification for treating radio and television as pub-
lic services is to ensure pluralistic expression. Beginning in the 
1960s, France recognized, at least in theory, the need for all seg-
ments of society to have the ability to communicate electroni-
cally.36 Many believe, however, that free expression and 
pluralism cannot thrive under a state monopoly.37 Government 
28 See Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1183-84 (Because radio frequencies are divided by 
international agreement, they constitute a "national good which must be preserved by 
monopoly or, at the least, strict control."). See also Chevalier, supra note 26, at 556. 
29 See Kerever, supra note 22, at 66. See also infra notes 101,243-44 and accompany-
ing text. 
30 See infra text accompanying notes 146-190. 
31 See infra text accompanying notes 243-44. 
32 Andre Malraux is reported to have said to United States President John F. Ken-
nedy, "I do not understand how you are able to govern your immense country without 
controlling its television." Todd, Pourquoi La Tete Est Malade, PARIS MATCH, Apr. 1, 1983, 
at 3,4. MISSIKA & WOLTON, supra note 24, at 20, col. 2, point out that the government 
imposed its strictest regulations during the unsettled times of 1968: "The political 
power-holders of the time, like almost all power-holders who overestimate television's 
direct influence, thought, wrongly, that a liberalization of [television] would be fatal to 
[the government]." See also Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1188 n.214 (The President of the 
Administrative Council said, in 1963, "It is natural for the majority of a nation to govern 
the use of television as it is a public service to inform the nation of its actions in all areas 
of public life."). 
33 Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 53. 
34 Chevalier, supra note 26, at 555. 
35 Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 57. 
36 Chevalier, supra note 26, at 555. See infra text accompanying note 198. Accord-
ing to one commentator, France has gone through different phases. First was a national-
istic phase, attempting to unify the country under a single identity. Next came the 
internationalist phase, where the ideals of France were felt to be common to all human-
ity. "Third was the pluralist phase, because it became obvious that uniformity represses 
minority interests, which clamor for recognition and freedom of expression. Pluralism is 
what the politicians are now trying to institutionalize. . . . The age of the minority as-
serting its right to be different has arrived." T. ZELDIN, THE FRENCH 506-07 (1980). See 
also Tarle, France: The End of the Monopoly, INTERMEDIA, May, 1982, at 23 (One reason for 
the Government monopoly over broadcasting "was the widely held conviction that only 
the government could operate the public service in an impartial and equitable way."). 
37 E.g., Chevalier, supra note 26, at 559 ("For some public service is the condition 
for free communication, for others, its negation.") See also Tarle, supra note 25, at 44-46; 
Bouissou, supra note 24 at 1168 ("The right to speak without the right to use airwaves is 
like the right of all citizens to build a castle.") 
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control limits the number of speakers on the airwaves, and the 
political party in control is invariably accused of dominating the 
news. French broadcast news has been widely perceived as 
slanted in favor of the government.38 Finally, there is the preva-
lent view that programming on French television is simply not 
very interesting.39 
II. THE HISTORY OF BROADCAST REGULATION 
The history of broadcast regulation in France has been de-
scribed as "incoherent and paradoxical."40 A review of that his-
tory reveals a country struggling to come to grips with both a 
powerful technology and a highly uncertain view of freedom of 
expressIon. 
A. Before WQrld War II 
The first law covering radio broadcasting was enacted on June 
30, 1923.41 The government's telegraph monopoly, created in 
1837,42 was extended to include "the emission of radio-electric 
signals. "43 While the government thus assumed absolute author-
ity over the technical operation ofbroadcasting,44 the law was not 
intended to give the government exclusive use of the airwaves.45 
Private radio operators were permitted to broadcast under 
licenses granted by the Administration of Posts and Telegraphs, 
38 See Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 57; Chevalier, supra note 26, at 555; Tarle, 
supra note 25, at 47-49. "Television in France has long been open to political manipula-
tion." D. GRAY & C. GRANT, CABLE TELEVISION IN WESTERN EUROPE: A LICENSE TO 
PRINT MONEY? 97 (1983). 
39 "[T]he fare served up by the domestic channels ... [is] almost universally ac-
knowledged as being dull and unappetizing, with the commercials frequently being 
more entertaining than the programmes." D. GRAY & C. GRANT, supra note 38, at 97. 
40 Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1110. Despite repeated changes in the law of commu-
nication, see supra note 2, one commentator states that "[t]he basic French system has 
resisted all reforms." Chevalier, supra note 26, at 50. 
41 Law of June 30, 1923, art. 85, 1924 Recueil Periodique et Critique [D.P.] IV 81, 
103. The first radio emissions from the Eiffel Tower had occurred in 1921. See Bouis-
sou, supra note 24, at 1113. 
42 Law of May 2, 1837, 1837 D.P. III 156, cited in W. EMERY, NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL SYSTEMS OF BROADCASTING 238 (1969). See also Kerever, supra note 22, at 61. 
43 See generally C. DEBBASCH, TRAITE DU DROIT DE LA RAoIODIFFUSION (RADIO ET 
TELEVISION) 54 (1967); C. COLLIARD, supra note 17, at 573-75. 
44 Kerever, supra note 22, at 62 ("This monopoly was justified on purely technical 
grounds, for freedom of the air would have spelled anarchy in the allocation of 
wavelengths and led to an impossible situation."). 
45 The state monopoly was "not one of use but of regulation." Debbasch, Us Ra-
dios Libres: Un Regime de Liberte Sous Suroeilfance Etatique, Recueil Dalloz Sirey, Chronique 
XX, 123, 124 (May 19, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Les Radios Libres]. See also Audiovisuel: 
fa nouvelle donne, REGARDS SUR L'ACTUALITE, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 25,27. 
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as long as they complied with state regulations and did not inter-
fere with public service broadcasts or pose any danger to national 
security.46 
Private radio flourished for a time. In 1933, there were 10 
private stations throughout France, competing with 14 govern-
ment-owned stations.47 One association of radio listeners, which 
helped plan programming, had as many as 75,000 members.48 
This private participation,however, was short-lived. Controversy 
arose over the fact that private broadcasters, who had been estab-
lished as not-for-profit organizations, were receiving substantial 
under-the-table income from the sale of advertising.49 Also, as 
the international situation worsened, pressure for centralized 
control over broadcasting intensified. Restrictions on private sta-
tions were gradually increased until the government was effec-
tively in controPO Private stations continued to broadcast until 
1941, when the Vichy government banned their operation.51 
Ironically, though, it was the post-liberation government which, 
in 1945, formally revoked all private radio licenses.52 Broadcast-
ing was placed under the control of a government organization, 
Radiodiffusion-TeIevision Fran!;aise (RTF). The RTF, which had 
been organized in 1941 under General Charles de Gaulle, was 
charged with running all broadcasting in France.53 
46 Decree of Nov. 24, 1923, 1924 D.P. IV 120 (especially arts. 8, 21-22), cited in 
ASSEMBLE NATIONALE, PROjET DE LOI No. 754, 7eme Legis., 2eme Sess. 10 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as PROjET DE LOI]. See also W. EMERY, supra note 42, at 239. 
47 See W. EMERY, supra note 42, at 241; Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1111 n.5. Be-
cause of the flexible approach of the law, French radio in the 1930's has been described 
as operating under a "regime of improvisation." Morand & Valter (quoting Debbasch, 
supra note 25, at 53). 
48 Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 75. 
49 W. EMERY, supra note 42, at 243. Not-for-profit associations were established 
pursuant to the Law of July 1, 1901. 
50 E.g., Les Radios Libres, supra note 45, at 124. Thus, in 1933, the State supplanted 
the local, private associations with two organizations designed to centralize control over 
broadcasting. Morand & Valter, supra note, 25, at 75. Then, in 1936, the State prohib-
ited all local news on private stations. Instead, all news was to emanate only from Gov-
ernment programming. W. EMERY, supra note 42, at 242. State control over 
broadcasting continued to increase during the decade. The decree of Oct. 13, 1938, 
imposed rigorous new supervision over every broadcast with an "economic, political or 
financial character." Morand & Walter, supra note 25, at 54. 
51 W. EMERY, supra note 42, at 243. 
52 Ordinance of Mar. 23, 1945, No. 45-472, 1945 Recueil Dalloz Legislation [D.L.]. 
See, e.g., Les Radios Libres, supra note 45, at 124; Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1115. Some 
private station owners were compensated for the loss of their property. Those sus-
pected of collaborating with the Germans, however, were denied compensation and, in 
some cases, received prison sentences. W. EMERY, supra note 42, at 243. 
53 See W. EMERY, supra note 42, at 243. After the war, it was generally considered 
the role of the State to further the "common interest," especially in the important area 
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B. The Fourth Republic 
During the twelve years of the Fourth Republic, from 1946 to 
1958,54 the state monopoly over broadcasting remained essen-
tially unchanged.55 When regular television broadcasts began in 
1948, they were simply treated like radio and run by the RTF.56 
Both media were subject to strict political control.57 The head of 
broadcast news, for example, met daily with representatives of 
the Ministers of Information, Industry and the Interior, where he 
"received his instructions" on the content of that evening's 
broadcast.58 Critics charged that radio was merely a "political 
organ in the service of the government. "59 A 1958 statement by 
the private Commission de la Presse deplored what it termed 
"the aggravation of the tendency for unilateral and partial news 
service in [radio] broadcasting and television."60 Throughout 
this period there were proposals for reform, but none was ever 
brought to debate in Parliament.61 One reason for this failure 
was that the frequent changes in government during the Fourth 
Republic prevented RTF from falling under the complete control 
of anyone party,62 which meant that different political views ac-
tually were broadcast depending on which party was in power at 
the time.63 
C. 1959: The First Reform 
Several factors combined to spur the first major revision of 
of communications. "For the leaders who had grown out of the resistance, it was essen-
tial to put an end to the power of wealth and private interests in the information sector." 
Tarl€:, supra note 25, at 47. 
54 The Fourth Republic is traditionally viewed as lasting from Oct. 27,1946, to Oct. 
4, 1958. E.g. Neuborne, supra note 9, at 378 n.54. 
55 See Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 55. 
56 The first regular television broadcasts were in 1948. Tarl€:, supra note 25, at 47. 
57 The Algerian crisis, which began in 1954, only heightened the problem of gov-
ernment manipulation of broadcasting. For example, when General de Bollardiere re-
signed his command in Algeria on March 28, 1957, news of the resignation was kept off 
the broadcast news of the day. F. CASTBERG, supra note 13, at 105 n.5. 
58 Tarl€:, supra note 25, at 47 (quoting F.O. GIESBERT, FRANCOIS MITTERAND 103 
(1977». 
59 F. CASTBERG, supra note 13, at 106. 
60 Id. George Hourdin, director of La Vie Catholique, warned in 1958 that "[nJews 
broadcasts are being infected by a form of censorship which is unacceptable because it is 
unacknowledged." Quoted in Tarl€:, supra note 25, at 48. 
61 There were sixteen major laws proposed to alter the operation of RTF, most of 
which would have given the organization at least a minimum of autonomy. See Bouissou, 
supra note 24, at 1116; Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 12. 
62 See Tarl€:, supra note 25, at 47-48. 
63 Morand & Walter, supra note 25, at 60. 
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broadcasting law, which occurred in 1959. First, RTF, operating 
without a written charter, was unable to cope with the administra-
tive and technological demands of a changing medium.64 Radio 
had evolved into the premier vehicle for entertainment and 
news,65 and television was finally available to the entire coun-
try.66 Most important, the Fifth Republic, beginning in 1956, es-
tablished a strong government, with President de Gaulle firmly in 
command.67 Many in the RTF called for a new arrangement to 
provide the organization both administrative and budgetary au-
tonomy from this new and powerful regime.68 
The Ordinance of February 4, 1959, established RTF as an 
"etablissement public," a separate public institution.69 Very little 
changed, however, in terms of government control over broad-
casting. The RTF monopoly continued, but the ordinance did 
not provide any real financial, administrative or political auton-
omy for the RTF.70 For example, the ordinance allowed the gov-
ernment to dismiss the Director General of RTF at any time.71 
Thus, government domination of the content of information 
conveyed by radio and television continued throughout the Fifth 
Republic. The crucial difference in this period was that, unlike 
the revolving door era of the Fourth Republic, the same govern-
ment stayed in power, and those in power were able to make ef-
fective use of the electronic media.72 As one commentator 
described the political success of the de Gaulle government: 
64 See Tarle, supra note 25, at 48; W. EMERY, supra note 42, at 246. 
65 Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1116. 
66 See Tarle, supra note 25, at 49; Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1115 (crediting the 
improved broadcast quality and "miniaturization" of television receivers for the growth 
in popularity of television). 
67 E.g., Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1115. 
68 See W. EMERY, supra note 42, at 246. 
69 Ordinance of Feb. 4,1959, No. 59-273, 1959J.0. 1859, 1959 D.L. 316. There 
are two types of public establishments in France: one which is totally under the power of 
the government, and the other of an "industrial and commercial" character, which tradi-
tionally has greater independence. PROJET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 65. Even though 
under the 1959 decree RTF was deemed an establishment of an industrial and commer-
cial character, it nonetheless lacked "administrative and financial autonomy." Bouissou, 
supra note 24, at 1112. 
70 E.g., Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1116-17. In addition to the monopoly on broad-
casting, the government also had a monopoly on the retransmission of its programs. 
Ordinance of Feb. 4, 1959, supra note 69, at art. 4. See Kerever, supra note 22, at 66-67 
(quoting article 4 of the Ordinance of Feb. 4, 1959). 
71 Ordinance of Feb. 4, 1959, supra note 69, at art. 5. See also F. CASTBERG, supra 
note 13, at 106. 
72 "The new majority could not avoid the temptation of employing this rapidly ex-
panding medium for its own ends .... " Tarle, supra note 25, at 49. 
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"Gaullism is personal power plus the monopoly of television."73 
D. 1964: The Creation of the ORTF 
Five years after the promulgation of the 1959 ordinance, Par-
liament passed a statute for radio and television.74 The rationale 
for the Law of June 27, 1964 was remarkably similar to that given 
for the ordinance. Among the aims of the new statute, according 
to the Minister of Information, were "to overcome the ineffi-
ciency of an organization imprisoned by its old stucture" and "to 
protect [the organization] from ... abuses of power."75 It was 
felt that a law, which could only be amended by an act of Parlia-
ment, would provide more stability than an ordinance, which 
could be altered at will by the ruling party. 76 
The 1964 law created two organizations. One, the Office de 
Radio-Television Fran~aise (ORTF), took over all the functions 
of the RTF.77 The other, the Conseil d'Administration (Adminis-
trative Council), was charged with overseeing the ORTF, to pro-
tect "public liberties" such as freedom of expression,78 and to 
prevent radio and television from becoming instruments to "con-
dition" the French people.79 
Still, while there was a separation of power between the 
ORTF and the watchdog Administrative Council, neither was 
73 Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1168 (quoting JJ. Servan-Schreiber). See also Tarle, 
supra note 25, at 43; F. CASTBERG, supra note 13, at 106. 
74 Law of June 27, 1964, supra note 2. 
75 Tarle, supra note 25, at 49-50. See also Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1117. Just as 
the inability of RTF to perform its duties competently and free from political pressure 
remained unchanged, so did its need to adapt to the growth of the range and influence 
of the electronic media. A second French national television channel began operating 
on April 18, 1964, see W. EMERY, supra note 42, at 256, and the rapid increase in the 
number of television sets in the country continued. There were 400,000 television sets 
in France in 1957, one million in 1958 and four million in 1963. Missika & Wolton, supra 
note 24, at 20, col. 1; Tarle, supra note 25, at 49. 
76 See W. EMERY, supra note 42, at 250. It was hoped that the new law would give 
broadcasting freedom "permanent, statutory sanction." [d. 
77 The Constitutional Council (Conseil Consitutionnel), in upholding the constitu-
tionality of the law, stated that because of the importance of its mission, "notably the 
communication of ideas and information," the ORTF was a public establishment "with-
out equivalent." Decision of Con. const. of March 19, 1964. The Constitutional Coun-
cil rules on the constitutionality oflaws, before they are promulgated, upon the request 
of the President of France, the Prime Minister, the President of either the Senate or the 
National Assembly, or 60 Deputies (members of the Assembly) or Senators. Const. art. 
61. There is no procedure for challenging the consitutionality ofa law once it has been 
enacted. See generally Beardsley, The Constitutional Council and Constitutional Liberties in 
France, 20 AM. J. COMPo L. 431 (1972). 
78 Law of June 27, 1965, supra note 2. See Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1170. 
79 Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1182. 
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well-insulated from government influence.8o The majority of the 
members of the board of directors of the ORTF and all the mem-
bers of the Administrative Council were appointed by the gov-
ernment.81 Also, the government was able to control the 
financing of the ORTF and fix the rules for the operation of the 
Administrative Counci1.82 Thus, the content of television news 
continued to be controlled by the government (this time by the 
Minister of Information);83 the Administrative Council, domi-
nated by political appointees and with weak enforcement powers, 
proved completely ineffective in policing the ORTF.84 
One of the few breakthroughs of the 1964 law was that it con-
tained the first direct statement that pluralism was a specific goal 
of the state broadcast monopoly. One of the ORTF's duties was 
to ensure that "the principal tendencies of thought and grand 
currents of opinion" were expressed.85 This was not the fully 
equal access to the airwaves sought by the opposition parties,86 
but it marked the beginning of official recognition that "public 
service" broadcasting needed to do more to serve the public in-
terest than simply spout the government's point of view. 
The 1965 presidential elections brought the first evidence of 
this change. All candidates were granted equal time on radio and 
television, and many attributed the gains made by the opposition 
parties in, the election to this new exposure.87 Still, the vast ma-
jority of radio and television programming, at least that which 
was controlled by the government, suffered from one of two 
flaws. Either the news blatantly espoused the government's point 
of view,88 or it was bland and nondescript.89 
80 /d. at 1166. 
81 Law of June 27, 1964, supra note 2, art. 4; Decree of July 22, 1964, No. 64-737, 
1964].0.6552, 1964 D.L. 260. See also Tarle, supra note 25, at 50; W. EMERY, supra note 
42, at 251. 
82 See Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1136-37. 
83 One government employee described the decision-making process: "Each morn-
ing, at about 11:00 a.m., ten or so civil servants would meet to determine: (1) What 
television should not deal with; (2) The official inaugurations and ceremonies which had 
to be given maximum coverage." Tarle, supra note 25, at 51. 
84 As one commentator noted, the Administrative Council seemed to prefer the 
"politics of the ostrich." Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 61. See also Bouissou, supra 
note 24, at 1196. The power of the Administrative Council is "more theoretical than 
real." Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1196. 
85 Law of June 27, 1964, supra note 2, art. 4. 
86 See Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1196. 
87 See Tarle, supra note 25, at 51. 
88 The complaints of government interference with broadcast news were legion: "It 
would be tedious to list all the cases of journalists silenced or sacked for their lack of 
submissiveness or of those dismissed for not conforming to the wishes of the govern-
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A major crisis for the ORTF arose in May, 1968. During the 
riots and political upheaval of that month, television news, pursu-
ant to government instructions, played down the critical nature 
of the events. Riots went unreported.90 The written press, as 
well as broadcasters from outside the country, covered the sto-
ries fully. The resulting gap between what viewers and listeners 
knew to be news and what was reported on French radio and tel-
evision destroyed both the credibility of public broadcasting and 
the morale of the ORTF.91 Embittered television journalists 
went on strike through the end ofJune.92 
One result of this turmoil was a reexamination of the relation-
ship between broadcasting and the government. A government 
commission (the Paye Commission) concluded that radio and tel-
evision should be "complete, correct, balanced, impartial and 
free."93 The commission also recommended that the grant of au-
thority to the ORTF be defined more precisely to clarify the 
ORTF's relationship to the government. Not only were these 
proposals never enacted into law, the commission's report was 
never even discussed in Parliament.94 
Instead, a new law was enacted in 1972, a law which made few 
significant changes from the 1964 statute.95 The composition of 
the ORTF board remained the same, though the term of the Di-
rector General was set at three years.96 The theory was that the 
three-year term would insulate the Director General from polit-
ical pressure and increase the autonomy of the ORTF.97 The 
first Director General under this law was removed, however, after 
serving only one year.98 
ment." Tarle, supra note 25, at 50. See also Missika & Wolton, supra note 24, at 20; 
Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1182-83. 
89 One critic stated that in the name of "objectivity and neutrality," television pro-
gramming often only reflected an "undifferentiated and homogeneous mass." Cheva-
lier, supra note 26, at 564. 
90 Tarle, supra note 25, at 52. 
91 Id. at 52-53. 
92 Id. Many of those who went on strike "have never been readmitted to televi-
sion." Smith, Some Conclusions, in TELEVISION AND POLITICAL LIFE 232-34 (A. Smith ed. 
1979). 
93 COMMISSION D'ETUDE DU STATUT DE L'ORTF, RApPORT (1970), quoted in Tarle, 
supra note 25, at 54-55. 
94 Tarle, supra note 25, at 55. 
95 Law of July 3, 1972, supra note 2. 
96 Id., art. 9. 
97 See Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 62; Tarle, supra note 25, at 55. 
98 Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 62. The 1972 Law also reaffirmed and ex-
panded the monopoly over broadcasting. The ORTF monopoly was described as cover-
ing, "any telecommunications process." Law of July 3, 1972, supra note 2, art. 2. This 
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Perhaps the most important innovation of the 1972 law was 
the extension of the "right of response" to radio and television 
for the first time.99 The right of response had been available 
since 1881 for persons who believed their reputations to have 
been injured in the written press. IOO Any person so injured could 
require a newspaper to print a response, drafted by the injured 
party, to the defamatory statement. This right has been widely 
viewed in France as a necessary protection both for individual 
rights and for free public debate. lol 
The government had justified its previous reluctance to per-
mit a right of response to broadcasting primarily because of the 
difficulty of proving the content of speech which had been broad-
cast but not taped. l02 Still, many believed that the government 
simply did not want to encourage replies by people allegedly in-
jured by government produced programming. l03 
The right of response finally created for broadcasting was 
more limited than that for the written press. While the 1881 
press law applied to any injured party, including individuals, 
political parties and labor unions, only natural persons could re-
spond to a broadcast. l04 Also, the type of statement triggering 
the right was narrower for broadcast. Not only did a person have 
to assert that his or her reputation had been called into question, 
which satisfied the burden of the old law, 105 but the person had 
to prove defamation by an erroneous statement. 106 
definition included not only traditional radio and television, but also programming dis-
tributed by satellite or carried over cable television. See Kerever, supra note 22, at 68. 
The law did provide for very limited exceptions to the monopoly, called "derogations." 
Law of July 3, 1972, supra note 2, art. 3. The Government was directed by decree also to 
grant derogations to those distributing programs either to specified, limited audiences 
(such as the hard-of-hearing) or within private property via closed circuit television. De-
cree of March 20,1978, No. 78-379,1978].0.1259,1978 D.S.L. 203. See, e.g., Kerever, 
supra note 22, at 63; Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 87; Chevalier, supra note 26, at 
561; Les Radios Libres, supra note 45, at 124. 
99 Law of July 3, 1972, supra note 2, art. 8. The ground rules for the right of re-
sponse for radio and television were laid out in the Decree of May 13, 1975, No. 75-341, 
1975 J.O. 4867, 1975 D.S.L. 148. 
100 Law of July 29, 1881, Bull. Off. 637, No. 10,850, art. 13, 1882 RECUEIL SIREY, 
Lois Anotees 1,6. A person mentioned in a news article is the sole judge of whether he or 
she has been injured. Toulemon, Le Droit de Reponse et fa Television, LA GAZETTE DU PA-
LAlS, DOCTRINE 393, 394 (1975). 
101 Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1196. 
102 /d. at 1178-79. 
103 Id. at 1186-87. 
104 Law of July 3, 1972, supra note 2, art. 8; Decree of May 13, 1975, supra note 99, 
art. 1. See also Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 91. 
105 See Toulemon, supra note 100, at 394; Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 91. 
106 See Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 91. 
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E. 1974: Dissolution of the ORTF 
The next major broadcasting reform occurred in 1974.107 As 
in the past, the drafters in justifying the new law cited the growth 
of television 108 and the need to put an end to the subjugation of 
broadcasting to politics. 109 This time, though, there were other 
perceived problems. ORTF had grown tremendously during the 
preceding decade, and many felt that the "monolithism and gi-
gantism" of the organization had led to gross inefficiency and in-
competency.ll° Also, many in government saw ORTF as a 
"bureaucracy dominated by unions,"lll which had undue influ-
ence over programmmg. 
Accordingly, the 1974 law split the ORTF into seven smaller 
organizations. The new division created organizations which re-
flected the distinction between programming and "diffusion," 
the technical aspect of broadcasting. 112 Thus, four programming 
societies were established, one for each of the three television 
channels, 113 and one for Radio France. One society was set up to 
supervise programming, 114 and a national institute was created to 
supervise production research, archives and training.lls The sev-
enth organization, TeIediffusion de France (TDF), was placed in 
charge of diffusion. 116 
The 1974 law was the most successful of all the attempts to 
reform broadcasting law in that it was able to accomplish fully at 
least one of its goals, namely the undermining of the strength of 
the unions. With their old structure destroyed, their members 
scrambling for jobs in the new organizations, and their member-
107 Law of August 7, 1974, supra note 2. 
108 The number of television sets in France rose from four million in 1963 to 13 
million in 1973. Missika & Wolton, supra note 24, at 20. Also, in 1971, a third television 
channel, FR3, began broadcasting. !d. See also infra text accompanying notes 65·66, 75. 
109 See Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 7; Chevalier, supra note 26, at 556. See also 
infra text accompanying notes 67-69, 75. 
110 Audiovisuel: la nouvelle donne, supra note 45, at 25. See also Morand & Valter, supra 
note 25, at 7. 
111 Missika & Wolton, supra note 24, at 20. 
112 See Kerever, supra note 22, at 67; Chevalier, supra note 26, at 571. The frame-
work of seven public service organizations out of one was termed a communications 
structure, "in the nature of archipelagos." Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 7. 
113 Law of Aug. 7, 1974, supra note 2, art. 8. The three television stations were TF1, 
A2, and FR3. 
114 Law of Aug. 7, 1974, supra note 2, art. 13. 
115 [d. art. 3. 
116 !d. art. 5. TDF was "assigned the task of seeing to the diffusion of radio and 
television programs in France and abroad, and of organizing, developing, operating and 
maintaining the diffusion networks and installations." [d. (translated in Kerever, supra 
note 22, at 64). 
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ship depleted and dispersed, the influence of the unions was sub-
stantially diluted. 117 
In most other respects, however, the 1974 reform suffered a 
fate similar to its predecessors. The state monopoly over broad-
casting continued, and government control over the personnel 
and financing of the organizations charged with running that mo-
nopoly went on unabated. 118 
The major chink in the state monopoly carne in Article 1 of 
the law, which guaranteed "equal access to the principal tenden-
cies of thought and important currents of opinion."119 There 
were several restrictions to this access, however, which prevented 
equitable presentation of opposing viewpoints. The actual right 
of access was limited to the m<tior political parties,120 reducing 
the number of potential speakers and the range of topics cov-
ered. Also, speakers were not guaranteed equal time, but rather 
a minimum amount of time. 121 This allowed the government, 
which controlled the broadcasting organizations, to dominate the 
airwaves. 122 
This control was exercised by three means. While the gov-
ernment did not have the power to select a majority of the direc-
tors of each organization, it did appoint the chairmen. 123 
Second, both the government and Parliament were able to decide 
how much money each of the organizations received. 124 The fi-
117 See Kerever, supra note 22, at 64; Tarle, supra note 25, at 59. 
118 Law of Aug. 7, 1974, supra note 2, arts. 2, 5, 11, 18. See Audiovisuel: fa nouvelle 
donne, supra note 45, at 25 (stating that the 1974 law was in "strict conformity" with those 
of 1959, 1964, and 1972); Chevalier, supra note 26, at 556 (saying that the 1974 law 
represented the "last chance" for the state monopoly). 
119 Law of Aug. 7, 1974, supra note 2, art. 1. This marked the first time that "equal 
access" was affirmed as a public service obligation. This "innovation," according 10 one 
commentator, marked a recognition by the legislature that equal access was "a necessary 
counterweight to monopoly." Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 96. 
120 Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 96. 
121 Law of Aug. 7, 1974, supra note 2, art. 15. The opposition party, the Socialists, 
led by Francois Mitterand, had unsuccessfully tried to include a right of "political re-
sponse" to press conferences and speeches made by the Prime Minister. Morand & 
Valter, supra note 25, at 94. 
122 See Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 97. 
123 Law of Aug. 7, 1974, supra note 2, arts. 5, 11. See also Tarle, supra note 25, at 58. 
"The government retained the power of appointing and dismissing all of the seven Di-
rectors General within an internally competitive system, so deep-seated is the belief that 
without an umbilical cord to government, broadcasting will inevitably construct links of 
a political kind with the opposition." Smith, supra note 92, at 235. In addition, many 
important lower level workers were hired only after meeting Government approval. See 
Tarle, supra note 25, at 58-59, 74. 
124 See Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 80-81; Tarle, supra note 25, at 58-59,74. 
Parliament did indeed attempt to use its financing power to influence public broadcast-
ers: "The National Assembly, which was unhappy with television, almost unanimously 
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nal element of government involvement was the cahiers des 
charges, 125 programming requirements imposed on the various 
channels by government order. Each station was required to 
meet numerous, specific programming obligations such as the 
broadcast of a certain number of French films, minimum number 
of concerts, weekly religious programming and various other 
mandated categories. 126 
The results of the 1974 reform, if not surprising, were disap-
pointing. Government influence over broadcasting, though per-
haps more subtle, nonetheless remained substantial. 127 While 
for the first time opposition politicians made regular appearances 
on current affairs programs,128 access for small parties and indi-
viduals was, at best, "mediocre."129 Complaints abounded that 
the government monopolized and censored broadcast news for 
its own benefit. 130 Finally, and unexpectedly, channels compet-
ing for higher ratings, which would increase their allotment of 
government financing, began reaching for the "lowest common 
denominator,"131 and observers agreed that the quality of pro-
gramming suffered. 132 
III. 1981: THE FIRST STEPS TOWARDS REFORM 
In 1981, three major events in France sparked hope that 
French communications law would finally be changed to produce 
a pluralistic and impartial system. The first of these was the elec-
tion of Fran~ois Mitterand as the President of France.133 Presi-
rejected the authorisations of payment of revenues in November 1975, and it only went 
back on its decision after difficult negotiations with the government." Id. at 60. 
125 The "cahiers des charges" is basically a "schedule of obligations" imposed on 
public service companies by the government. Law of Aug. 7, 1974, supra note 2, art. 15. 
Because of this power to impose obligations, "the risks of this new independence are 
lessened .... " Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 52. 
126 See generally Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 66-71. 
127 See, e.g., Missika & Wolton, supra note 24, at 20 (After 1974, "the influence of 
political power, even ifless strong than before, remained by habit, indirect pressure and 
self-censorship more than the European average."). 
128 See Tarle, supra note 25, at 62, 67-68. 
129 Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 73. Political groups too small to have repre-
sentatives in Parliament were excluded from radio and television. See Tarle, supra note 
25, at 60-61. 
130 See, e.g., Morand & Valter, supra note 25, at 98; Tarle, supra note 25, at 46,73-75. 
131 Audiovisuel: fa nouvelle donne, supra note 45, at 28; Missika & Wolton, supra note 24, 
at 20 (One of the major criticisms of the 1974 law was that it resulted in a "timid taking 
into account" of the television audience.). 
132 See Tarle, supra note 25, at 75 ("The 1974 reform helped to speed up the process 
of debasement which was already noticeable before."). 
133 Les Radio Libres, supra note 45, at 123. 
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dent Mitterand had a long history of criticizing the pro-
government bias of the state broadcast monopoly and had fre-
quently called for greater access for those not in power. 134 
The second was the release of the Moinot Commission re-
port. 135 At the behest of the new Minister of Communications, a 
commission, headed by Pierre Moinot, had been established to 
propose a new audiovisual law .136 On October 6, 1981, the com-
mission released a report which called for a total revamping of 
the communications law and a strict division between govern-
ment and the media. 137 The report called for the creation of a 
High Authority (H.A.) to oversee telecommunications regula-
tion. 138 Two central provisions were to ensure the independence 
of the H.A.: only three of the nine members of the H.A. were to 
be appointed by the government,139 and the budget was to be 
largely autonomous. 140 The public service was also to be in-
dependent of the government. None of the members of the 
boards of directors of the public service companies was to be ap-
pointed by the government, and the companies were to have di-
verse sources of funding. 141 Finally, the report called for private 
access to electronic mass communications. Private radio opera-
tors and private cable television programmers were to be author-
134 See, e.g., supra note 12l. 
135 LA COMMISSION DE REFLEXION ET D'ORIENTATION, POUR UNE REFORME DE 
L'AuDIOVISUEL (1981) [hereinafter cited as MOINOT COMMISSION]. 
136 See Chevalier, supra note 26, at 557. (Communications Minister Georges Fillioud 
announced the formation of the Commission on May 26, 1981.) 
137 See infra text accompanying notes 138-42. See also Chevalier, supra note 26, at 
558. 
138 MOINOT COMMISSION, supra note 135, at 20. 
139 Three other members were to be appointed by judges serving on the highest 
courts, one nominated each by the First President of the Supreme Court of Appeals, the 
First President of the Tax Court, and the Vice-President of the Conseil d'Etat (the high-
est administrative tribunal). These six members would then name the final three mem-
bers from a list compiled by the National Audiovisual Council. (The Council was to be 
composed of 60 members, representing elected national and local officials, unions, in-
dustry, program producers and the public.) The nine members would then designate a 
President of the H.A. /d. at 32. 
140 /d. at 29. 
141 Three members of the nine-member Boards of Directors of the public service 
companies were to be selected by the H.A., another three by the National Audiovisual 
Council, and the final three by employees of the broadcasting organizations. These nine 
would choose from among themselves the president of the Board, who would be respon-
sible for appointing heads of the various channels. /d. at 40. The Commission also said 
that without the guarantee of adequate and independent financial means for the public 
service companies, the other proposed reforms "will only have an abstract value." See 
also id. at 105. Nonetheless, the government was still to be involved in financing public 
service to the extent that it would give direct grants and loans to the public service 
companies. [d. at 104. 
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ized by the H.A.142 
The third major groundbreaking event of 1981 was the pas-
sage of the "Waivers of the State Broadcasting Monopoly" law 
on November 9.143 This statute legalized private control of radio 
stations for the first time in almost half a century. 
Beginning in 1977, illegal private stations, generally known as 
"free radio," had multiplied throughout France.144 Two factors 
were cited for this growth. One was the poor programming of 
the centralized national public radio station, which proved unre-
sponsive to local community needs. 145 The second was the im-
provements made in radio technology, which permitted the use 
of a wider range of radio frequencies at low cost.146 
The initial government response to this assault on its monop-
oly by so-called "savage" local radio stations147 was the enact-
ment of a strict penal law in 1978.148 The law criminalized radio 
and television broadcasting in violation of the state monopoly, 
with punishments including imprisonment of one month to a 
year and fines of between 10,000 and 100,000 francs. 149 
The 1981 law did not do away with the concept of a state mo-
nopoly over radio150 but did create ground rules for waivers of 
the monopoly. The bill was thus characterized less as a true re-
form than as a return to the regulatory regime which existed 
prior to World War II}51 
As was proposed by the Moinot Commission, private broad-
casters could only operate after receiving a preliminary authori-
142 [d. at 53, 61-62. This division is analogous to the one established by the 1974 
Law, between "diffusion" and radio programming. See supra text accompanying notes 
115-19. 
143 Law of Nov. 9,1981, No. 81-994, 1981 ].0.3070,1981 D.S.L. 367. 
144 Les Radio Libres, supra note 45, at 123. A 1978 survey by TDF, which was charged 
with policing the airwaves for just such violations of the government monopoly, found 
58 illegal private stations, 27 in the Paris area. /d. 
145 [d. See also Chevalier, supra note 26, at 557 (Private stations gave viewers the 
chance to "break free of the constraints of State programming and affirm their own 
tastes."). 
146 Les Radio Libres, supra note 45, at 123. 
147 AudiovisueL' /a nouvelle donne, supra note 45, at 214. 
148 Law of July 28,1978, No. 78-787, 1978J.0. 2935,1978 D.S.L. 345. One com-
mentator said that this law, in attempting to protect the state monopoly, "ignored the 
impossibility of holding a defensive position for too long." AudiovisueL'/a nouvelle donne, 
supra note 45, at 28. See also Les Radio Libres, supra note 45, at 123 (terming the penal law 
"repressive") . 
149 Law of July 28, 1978, supra note 148, art. 1. 
150 Law of Nov. 9, 1981, supra note 143, art. 3-1. The continuance of the State mo-
nopoly was termed "a political imperative." Debbasch, supra note 45, at 124. 
151 See Debbasch, supra note 45 at 124. See also supra text accompanying notes 41-48. 
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zation.152 The authorizations, however, were to come not from 
an independent body but from the office of the Prime Minister. 153 
A 21-member commission representing a broad range of inter-
ests (including broadcasters) was also created, with the mission 
of advising the Prime Minister as to which parties should be 
awarded authorizations. 154 The policing ability of this commis-
sion was limited by two factors. First, the commission had only 
consultative power, since the government was not required to 
follow its suggestions.155 Second, while eight different groups 
were represented in the commission, the law provided that 
eleven members, enough for a majority, were to be selected 
either by the state or by state appointees. 156 Supporters of the 
law, however, were quick to point out that the power of the gov-
ernment to dispense authorizations was not unfettered. 157 In-
deed, the Constitutional Council ruled that the power was not 
"discretionary" as the government was obligated to "ensure the 
free and pluralistic expression of ideas and views," in keeping 
with "the constitutional principles of freedom and equality."158 
Thus, the government's actions in dispensing authorizations 
were subject to judicial review. 159 
The authorizations, once awarded, were not regarded as per-
manent property rights. 1~0 The authorizations were revocable 
under two circumstances. 161 The first was when revocation was 
necessary for the general welfare, if, for example, the authorized 
frequencies were needed for a new airport. 162 The second 
ground for revocation of an authorization was the failure of the 
broadcaster to live up to its legal obligations. 163 
152 Law of Nov. 9, 1981, supra note 143, art. 3-l. 
153 !d., art. 3-3. 
154 !d. 
155 See Les Radio Libres, supra note 45, at 125. 
156 The 11 members of the commission appointed by the Government were: three 
chosen specifically as representatives of the State, two members of the Assembly (from 
the President's party), one representative each from the public service radio and diffu-
sion company, three representatives of cultural and educational societies, and the chair 
of the commission, chosen from the Conseil d'Etat. Law of Nov. 9, 1981, supra note 143, 
art. 3-3. In the words of one commentator, "It is a very wide power that the government 
has kept for its elfin composing the commission." Les Radio Libres, supra note 45, at 125. 
157 See Les Radio Libres, supra note 45, at 125. 
158 Decision of Con. const. of Oct. 30, 1981. 
159 See Les Radio Libres, supra note 45, at 125. 
160 The Law of Nov. 9,1981, supra note 143, states in art. 3-1: "The waivers [of the 
government's broadcast monopoly] are precarious and revocable." 
161 See Les Radio Libres, supra note 45, at 125. 
162 See SCHREINER, LA LOI SUR LA COMMUNICATION AUDIOVISUEL 5 (1982). 
163 Les Radio Libres, supra note 45, at 125-27. 
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These obligations included the declaration of a "principal ob-
ject."164 In order to ensure pluralism and preserve each station's 
distinct identity, holders of authorizations had to announce the 
principal goal of the station, such as news or culture.165 While a 
station could occasionally broadcast programs on other themes, 
the holder of the authorization was barred from diverting the sta-
tion to a different purpose. Though such declarations could in 
theory help the government maintain diverse programming, 
some feared that they would prove excessively rigid, barring all 
possibility of innovation. 166 
A major concern of the drafters of the 1981 law was to pre-
serve the local character of private radio. 167 Thus, as had been 
proposed by the Moinot Commission, a strict geographic limit on 
the signal range of private stations was included in the law. 16B 
The law was somewhat more generous than the Commission, 
however, permitting transmission in a thirty, rather than twenty, 
kilometer radius. A second requirement, which was also 
designed to avoid creating private radio networks, was that each 
station was required to produce at least 80% of its own program-
ming. 169 Finally, holders of one authorization were barred from 
having any interest, however indirect, in any other station.170 
An additional legislative concern was to prevent free radio 
from falling under the domination of large commercial inter-
ests. 171 Toward this goal, another recommendation of the Moi-
not Commission was adopted. Only non-profit associations were 
permitted to obtain authorizations. 172 
One major commission proposal was pointedly rejected by 
164 !d. at 127. 
165 !d. 
166 See Chevalier, supra note 26, at 562. 
167 Les Radio Libres, supra note 45, at 126. 
16B In addition to the geographic limit, private operators were limited to the FM 
band and the maximum broadcast power was fixed at 500 watts. See Kerever, supra note 
22, at 68; Les Radio Libres, supra note 45, at 124-26. 
169 See Les Radio Libres, supra note 45, at 127. Additionally, the stations had to carry 
at least 84 hours of programming a week. The goal of this requirement was "to incite 
the stations to creativity." [d. 
170 [d. at 127-28. Another aim of this limitation was to prevent the creation oflarge 
private networks. See Chevalier, supra note 26, at 562. See also infra text accompanying 
notes 171-72. 
171 See Les Radio Libres, supra note 45, at 128. 
172 Law of Nov. 9, 1981, supra note 143, art. 3-l. This rule was termed "indispensa-
ble for preserving the essential local and community character" of radio. Chevalier, 
supra note 26, at 562. The constitutionality of this restriction was upheld by the Consti-
tutional Council, which ruled that "eliminating all profit motive" from broadcasting was 
a legitimate state aim. Decision of Con. const. of Oct. 30, 1981. 
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the drafters of the law: private parties were precluded from fi-
nancing through advertisements. 173 Various reasons were given 
for the ban, including the need to avoid creating private monop-
olies 174 and the difficulty of enforcing laws against false advertis-
ing.175 Perhaps the primary reason for the ban, however, as was 
the case for advertising restrictions on public broadcasting, 176 
was to protect the advertising revenue of the print media. 177 A 
second objective was apparently more ideological and focused on 
keeping speech over radio out of the "capitalist field," generally 
removed from the influence of money. 178 
There was opposition to the advertising ban.179 Some sug-
gested that, without advertising, private broadcasters would be 
placed under a different form of dependency. 180 They would be 
forced to turn to more "insidious" sources of financing, such as 
local governments or under-the-counter, indirect advertising. 181 
Additionally, some felt it unfair that public radio, which com-
peted directly with private stations, was able to finance through 
advertising while this source was denied to private broadcast-
ers.182 This contention was rejected by the Constitutional Coun-
cil, which held that the distinction was justified in light of the 
"particular responsibilities" of the public service,183 including 
the responsibility of providing equal access to the major schools 
of thought and opinion.184 This was so even though the principle 
of equality was to apply to private stations only in the division of 
the radio spectrum,185 with individual stations expected to be 
173 Law of Nov. 9, 1981, supra note 143, art. 3·6. 
174 See Les Radios Libres, supra note 45, at 127. 
175 Id. (quoting the discussion in the National Assembly on the "difficulty for the 
state actually to set up a very heavy bureaucratic system to control at the local level the 
volume as well as the nature and truth of advertising messages."). 
176 See infra note 218. 
177 See Audiovisuel: la nouvelle donne, supra note 45, at 32; Les Radios Libres, supra note 
45, at 127. Many felt that none of the other reasons offered to support the advertising 
ban was "convincing." Id. 
178 Les Radios Libres, supra note 45, at 127. 
179 Id. ("But is it legitimate to condemn advertising financing of a new means of 
expression in the name of defending another means of expression?"). 
180Id. 
181 In the words of one commentator, "In holding one's nose in front of direct ad-
vertising, one gives birth to the opening of the cesspool of indirect advertising." Id. at 
128. 
182 !d. at 127. 
183 Decision of Con. const. of Oct. 30, 1981. 
184 Id. See Les Radios Libres, supra note 45, at 126. 
185 The Law of Nov. 9, 1981, supra note 143, requires, inter alia: "In each given area, 
waivers of the monopoly and the resulting frequency sharing must secure the free and 
pluralistic expression of ideas and trends of opinions." 
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narrowly partisan. 186 
In sum, the law did bring about a mctior change in French 
electronic communications. The airwaves were finally legally 
open to private broadcasters, and listeners were finally able to 
receive diverse and divergent viewpoints. Nonetheless, the abil-
ity of the government to influence, if not control, these broad-
casters was not eliminated. As one commentator observed: "The 
window of freedom, half-opened by the legislator, depends on 
the governmental authority who has the power to grant the 
authorization." 187 
IV. 1982: THE MOST AMBITIOUS REFORM188 
The 1981 radio law was only a first step toward actual reform 
of France's communications law. Both the government and the 
Moinot Commission had called for reform of the entire system of 
electronic communications.189 This reform was completed, and a 
comprehensive statute went into effect on July 29, 1982.190 
This law covers far more than just radio and television broad-
casting. Rather, for the first time, the term "audiovisual commu-
nications" is used. 191 The term includes all means of 
transmitting messages to the public over a distance, whether by 
broadcast or cable. 192 Also covered by the law are all forms of 
messages, including teletext and videotext, as well as traditional 
radio and television programs. 193 
The law maintains the government monopoly on "diffusion," 
186 See Les Radios Libres, supra note 45, at 126. 
187 /d. at 125. 
188 Chevalier, supra note 26, at 559. 
189 See letter of Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy to President Francois Mitterand, re-
printed in MOINOT COMMISSION, supra note 135, at 3. See also id. at II-I7. 
190 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2 (unofficial translation of the French Embassy 
in London). 
191 [d. art. 1. But if. supra note 98 (The 1972 law referred to "any telecommunica-
tions process.") Law of July 3, 1972, supra note 2. Unlike the 1972 Law, the 1982 Law 
was specifically intended to cover services such as videotext as well as radio and televi-
sion programming. See infra text accompanying note 193. 
192 The Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, provides, inter alia: "For the purposes of 
the present Act, audio-visual communications comprises the provision to the public, by 
direct radio wave or cable, of sounds, pictures, documents, information or messages of 
any nature." This definition excludes private telephone and telegraph communications. 
PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 14. 
193 See Chevalier, supra note 26, at 566 (saying that the 1982 Law recognizes that 
communication is no longer "linear and unilateral" but is instead, "global, interactive, 
abundant, multidimensionaL"). 
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the technical means of transmission. 194 Also continued is the 
concept of "public service."195 The public service organizations, 
running the state radio stations and television channels, are 
charged with "serving the general interest" and respecting the 
principles of "pluralism and neutrality."196 
Two mcyor goals of the law would, if realized, revolutionize 
French communications. One is to "safeguard" the indepen-
dence of the public service. 197 The other, termed the "corner-
stone of the law," is the termination of the government's 
monopoly on audiovisual communications.198 Expanding on the 
1981 law, this statute attempts to create a "space of liberty" for 
those who want to communicate electronically with the public. 199 
Article 1 of the law declares: "Audio-visual communication is 
free."200 This deliberately mirrors the language of the century-
old law on the rights of the written press, which begins: "Press 
and publishing are free."201 
In addition to the freedom to communicate, the law guaran-
tees the corollary right to receive information electronically. Ar-
ticle 2 states: "Citizens are entitled to free and pluralistic audio-
visual communication."202 The law was intended to create a 
194 The public service establishment, Telediffusion de France (TDF), supervises the 
monopoly over diffusion. Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 34. 
195 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 5. See, e.g., Kerever, supra note 22, at 288. 
196 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 5. See also PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 
13 ("For it is the public service which alone is able to play an essential role in permitting 
the exercise of the right of citizens to free and pluralistic audiovisual communications."). 
In addition to the TDF, the 1982 Law provides for several other public service organiza-
tions, including Radio France, which operates national public radio (art. 35); TFI and 
A2, which operate the two national television channels (art. 36); FR3, which operates the 
regional television channel (art. 49); and the National Programming Society (art. 49). 
See infra text accompanying notes 238-43. See also France: New Broadcasting Law, IN-
TERMEDIA, May 1982, at 7-8 [hereinafter cited as New Broadcasting Law]. 
197 See PRO JET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 27. 
198 Durieux & Cojean, An II de La Communication Audiovisuelle, Le Monde, July 30, 
1983, at 1. 
199 PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 13~ Broadcast television, however, is to remain 
under the complete control of the government monopoly. See infra text accompanying 
notes 242-43. 
200 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 1. 
201 Law of July 29, 1881, supra note 18. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16. 
See also An II, supra note 198, at 1. One reason this language was chosen was to 
demonstrate the link between this new freedom and that which preceded it: "Freedom 
of opinion; freedom of expression; freedom of the press; freedom to communicate. This 
[marks an] ascending progression of liberties gained by a people in the course of its 
national history. . . . The ambition here is not to substitute one freedom for an-
other. . . . but rather to crown the whole fabric of 'intellectual' freedoms with a new 
one that encompasses all the others." D'Arcy, The 'Right to Communicate' and the Meaning 
of Words, INTERMEDIA, Mar. 1983, at 9-10. 
202 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 1. 
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"multiplicity of choice" in the audiovisual field comparable to 
that available from the written press.203 
In the version of the law originally passed by the National As-
sembly, the freedom of audiovisual communication was to be 
protected "in particular" by the public service and the ability of 
private persons to have access to the electronic media.204 The 
Senate amended the law to specify a third element protecting this 
freedom: the Bigh Authority.205 
A. The Protective Screen of the High Authority206 
In what was termed the law's "most spectacular innovation," 
the Bigh Authority for Audiovisual Communication (B.A.) was 
created.207 The B.A. was instituted to "cut the umbilical cord" 
between the various electronic media and the executive branch of 
government.208 
The B.A. was thus charged with the formidable mission of 
removing audiovisual communications from the extensive reach 
of the government.209 When the B.A. was officially installed, 
President Mitterand echoed the words of the Moinot Commis-
sion and called the B.A. "the key to the vault of the new audiovi-
sual structure."210 
Not all of the recommendations of the Moinot Commision 
were, however, ultimately carried out. Key provisions intended 
to ensure the complete autonomy of the B.A. were altered. The 
result was that the entity created to prevent undue government 
influence over communications was itself granted only "limited 
independence" from the government.211 
203 PROJET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 16. 
204 Id. at 17-18. 
205 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 4. See also PROJET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 
18. The Senate had attempted to add an additional safeguard, a requirement that the 
government exert no control over news on radio and television. This proposal was re-
jected by the National Assembly because of its "polemic character" and because the 
High Authority would "guarantee the independence of the public service." !d., quoting 
socialist deputy M.B. Schreiner. 
206 Chevalier, supra note 26, at 566. 
207 Tarle, supra note 25, at 21. 
208 PROJET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 31. 
209 Art. 12 of the Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, provides that the H.A. is 
"charged in particular with safeguarding the independence of the public sound and tele-
vision broadcasting service." One commentator stated that, as a result of the creation of 
the H.A., "the government, at least in theory, is freed from the responsibilities that, until 
now, it shouldered under difficult conditions .... " Tarle, supra note 25, at 21-22. 
210 Chevalier, supra note 26, at 566. 
211 Id. at 570. 
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One of the most important departures from the Commis-
sion's proposal came in the method of selecting H.A. members. 
The Commission had proposed that the President select only 
three members, with three selected by the judiciary and the final 
three selected by the first six. This method "would have ensured 
a substantial degree of independence from direct political con-
trol."212 The law provides instead that all nine members are ap-
pointed by elected officials: three by the President, three each by 
the leaders of the National Assembly and Senate.213 This means 
that the political party in power will always be able to appoint at 
least a majority of six members of the H.A.214 
The ability of the H.A. to resist political influence is further 
eroded by the mechanism created to finance it. Rejecting the 
Moinot Commission's call for an autonomous budget,215 the law 
states that the operating expense of the H.A. will be paid directly 
out of the Prime Minister's budget.216 As this financing arrange-
ment was selected to ensure "interministerial responsibility," all 
interested government ministers, including, for example, those 
responsible for communication and culture, will have some input 
in determining the annual budget for the H.A.217 
B. Public Service 
As with the Moinot Commission's proposals on the structure 
and finance of the H.A., many of the Commission's recommenda-
tions on the division of responsibility for public service were 
212 New Broadcasting Law, supra note 196, at 7. See supra text accompanying note 140. 
213 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 23. 
214 For the entire history ofthe Fifth Republic, "every President has governed with a 
majority for his coalition in the National Assembly." Presidency Isn't Affected, N.Y. Times, 
July 17, 1984, at A4, col. 1. See also Chevalier, supra note 26, at 567. The primary justifi-
cation given for the change in the selection process was that the process chosen was the 
same as that provided in the Constitution for the selection of the Constitutional Council, 
and, thus, "the most difficult to contest." Chevalier, supra note 26, at 567. It was also 
argued that it would be virtually undemocratic to mistrust those officials who had been 
selected by "universal suffrage." PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 44. Additionally, it 
was hoped that, once appointed, the members of the H.A. would be able to act indepen-
dently of the Government which appointed them. /d. For example, the irrevocable 
nine-year term, Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 2, is supposed to insulate the 
H.A. from political pressure. It was said that the fact that the term was not revocable 
would enable the H.A. "to resist all pressure." PRO JET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 44. 
215 See supra text accompanying note 135. 
216 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 25. See also Chevalier, supra note 26, at 
558,568. 
217 PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 46. Even though the Ministries of Communica-
tion and Culture have since been lowered in rank, see France: Government Changes, IN-
TERMED lA, May 1983, at 3, numerous interested government officials can still help 
determine the budget for the H.A. 
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changed to give the government more influence. For example, 
the Prime Minister, not the H.A., will control the financing of the 
public service organizations.218 Many feared that this power, 
which included the power to distribute revenues raised from ad-
vertising and taxes, renewed the risk of subordination of broad-
casting, but the Minister of Communication argued that the 
disbursement of public funds was a non-delegable governmental 
duty.219 
An additional power given to the government instead of the 
H.A. is the fixing of the "schedule of obligations" of the public 
service organizations.22o These obligations include the general 
mission of each group, such as choosing between national and 
regional programming; general principles, such as pluralism and 
objectivity; and specific rules in areas such as films and religious 
programming.221 While the fact that the schedule of obligations 
is fixed in advance may help protect the autonomy of the organi-
zations, critics have contended that because the obligations can 
be changed unilaterally at any time, the government will still be 
218 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 61. See supra text accompanying note 139. 
219 PROjET DE LOI, supra, note 46 at 108. See also Chevalier, supra note 26, at 569. 
The H.A. can regulate advertising to ensure that it is truthful, see the Law of July 29, 
1982, supra note 2, art. 19, and along with another agency, the Regie Francaise de Pub-
licite, polices advertisements to ensure that they fulfill all requirements laid out in the 
schedule of obligations. Id., art. 66. The ceiling on advertising revenue was raised from 
25% of a station's funding to 80%. !d., art. 84. The 25% ceiling had replaced a total 
ban on broadcasting advertising which had existed until 1968. (A 1961 Budget Appro-
priations Act had prohibited advertising without legislative approval.) W. EMERY, supra 
note 42, at 257. This requirement was not included in the 1964 law, and advertising 
began in 1968. Id. Both the ban and the ceiling reflected a historical antagonism toward 
the use of commercials on the airwaves. One source of this hostility was the feared two-
fold impact on viewers: first, because advertising aroused artificial needs, Bouissou, 
supra note 24, at 1191; and second, because advertising would reduce the quality of 
programming by forcing programmers to vie for the largest audiences by striving for the 
lowest common denominator. !d. 
The primary reason, though, for the restriction on advertising was to protect the 
revenue base of the written press. See, e.g., MOINOT COMMISSION, supra note 135, at 107. 
The French newspapers, concerned that they could not compete as a selling medium 
with radio and television, continually fought against the introduction of broadcast adver-
tising. In 1968, however, the television stations ran short offunds and the Government 
opposed raising taxes and advertising was seen as the easiest way to make up the eco-
nomic shortfall. See, e.g., Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1194 ("How do you resist such a 
generous offer of revenue in exchange for such an insignificant service.") To appease 
the press, a compromise was reached. Advertising would be permitted on the public 
service channels, but only for four minutes a day and subject to the 25%-of-the-total-
funding ceiling. See Missika & Wolton, supra note 24, at 20, MOINOT COMMISSION, supra 
note 135, at 107. 
220 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 32. 
221 See PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 61. The schedule of obligations was termed 
the government's "most direct involvement" with the public service organizations. 
Chevalier, supra note 26, at 569. 
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too directly involved in both programming and management 
decisions.222 
The H.A.'s role in drawing up the schedule of obligations is 
again purely consultative.223 The H.A. can make recommenda-
tions, but the government is not bound. As with the issue of fi-
nancing, the Minister of Communications stated: "It is out of the 
question for the government to delegate its regulatory power to 
the H.A. "224 
The law did give the H.A. limited rule-making authority. In 
particular, the H.A. can fix rules concerning political campaigns, 
access to broadcast facilities by political parties and the right of 
reply to government programming.225 Supporters of the law say 
that these transfers of power were especially important, as they 
covered the areas where the government was most likely to be 
accused of "partiality."226 
The law's guarantee of equal time for candidates during polit-
ical campaigns and access for political parties between elections 
basically carried over a requirement of the 1974 law.227 Under 
the new law, any group of 30 deputies in the National Assembly 
or 15 members of the Senate can demand broadcast time.228 
Smaller parties with fewer representatives can combine forces to 
qualify for access to the airwaves.229 Unions and national profes-
sional organizations were also given air time.230 The H.A.'s re-
sponsibility includes setting the rules for this access and policing 
the public service organizations to make sure that each group re-
ceives sufficient time.231 
There is no individual right of access to the public service 
broadcasting system except for the "right to respond" to govern-
ment programming, which was essentially carried over from the 
222 PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 6l. 
223 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 15. See also PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, 
at 6l. 
224 PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 34. 
225 Law of July 29,1982, supra note 2, art. 14. Art. 13 of the Law states: "The High 
Authority enforces the proper perfonnance by those bodies responsible for them of the 
public service duties referred to in this Act." This article, however, is merely a declara-
tion in "l'esprit du legislateur," and does not add to the power given to the H.A. in art. 
14. PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 3l. 
226 PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 33. 
227 See supra text accompanying notes 120-22. 
228 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 33. 
229 The leaders ofthese parties then decide when each coalition member receives air 
time. See PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 63. 
230 See Chevalier, supra note 26, at 564. 
231 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 14. 
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1972 law.232 Responsibility for policing the right of response is 
divided. The H.A. is in charge of both rule-making and enforce-
ment for public service organizations.233 For all other broadcast-
ers, the Conseil d'Etat (Council of State) lays down the rules, 
which the H.A. can "clarify and complete," and the courts must 
enforce.234 
The other area where the H.A. is given important authority, 
previously reserved for the government, is the power of appoint-
ment. The H.A. selects the chairmen, along with three other 
members, of the 12-person board of directors of each of the pub-
lic companies running the three public service television chan-
nels and the national radio system.235 
As for the creation of programming for the public service, 
however, the government retains much control. While the law 
permits the public service companies to use private sources of 
programming, most programming will continue to come from 
the National Programming Society (SNP),236 and the law pro-
vides many ways for the government to exert influence over the 
SNP. First, the government is the majority shareholder in the 
SNP.237 Second, although the president of the SNP's 12-member 
232 Id. art. 6. See supra text accompanying notes 99-106. A person has the right to 
respond to any broadcast statement susceptible of being construed as an attack on his or 
her honor or reputation. The response must be broadcast under "equivalent technical 
conditions" and in "such a way as to ensure an equivalent audience" to the original 
broadcast. Law of July 29, supra note 2, art. 6. As with the 1972 law, this right ofre-
sponse to broadcasts is far narrower than the right to respond to the written press, 
which requires no proof of possible negative interpretations or consequences. See 
Toulemon, supra note 100, at 394. 
233 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 14. 
234 /d., art. 6. It is unclear what role the H.A. will play in policing the right of re-
sponse to non-public service broadcasts. PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 34. The re-
sponsibility for resolving disputes over the right to respond to non-public service 
broadcasts, though, rests with the Tribunal de Grande Instance. Law of July 29, 1982, 
supra note 2, art. 6. 
235 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, arts. 39, 41. For each of the two national 
television companies and the national radio station, a total offour of the twelve directors 
are appointed by the H.A., two are appointed by the Senate, two by employees of the 
company, and two by the National Audiovisual Communications Council (NACC) (an 
advisory body of 56 representatives of journalists, workers, the "cultural and scientific 
worlds," and "major spiritual and philosophical movements".). Id. art. 28. The re-
gional television company's board consists of one member appointed by the H.A., two 
by employees, one by the NACC and three by regional public service television compa-
nies. The power of the executive branch to appoint members of the boards of radio and 
television companies is, notably, relatively weak. By contrast, the state appoints six of 
sixteen members of the board which controls the monopoly on diffusion, TDF. /d., art. 
35. See generally Chevalier, supra note 26, at 559; PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 66-75. 
236 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 45. 
237 /d. Other shareholders include the public service television companies and may 
124 STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 
council of administrators is appointed by the H.A., eight are cho-
sen by the "shareholders."238 As the state is the mqiority share-
holder, it can appoint a majority of the SNP's ruling council. 
Finally, the law provides that the public service companies in 
charge of the television channels participate, along with the gov-
ernment, in the funding of the SNP.239 This entails a symbiotic 
relationship between the public channels and the public pro-
grammers, to the detriment of private production societies.240 
In addition, a private party can receive a "concessionary con-
tract" to assume the responsibilities of a public service organiza-
tion.241 A public service concessionaire must uphold all of the 
obligations of the public service company as well as be subject to 
strict governmental control. The Moinot Commission had rec-
ommended that concessions be the major instrument for fulfil-
ling public service obligations, but the law limits the use of 
concessions to channels which supplement the three public ser-
vice channels.242 Thus, the only access by private concession-
aires to the public service will either be a fourth channel to be 
used for teletext or a fifth channel available after the launch of a 
new broadcast satellite.243 The law makes clear that the three ex-
isting broadcast television channels are to remain under the com-
plete control of the public service companies. 
C. Private Audiovisual Communications 
For those who desire to communicate outside the public ser-
vice, the 1982 law carries over much of the substance of the 1981 
radio law.244 Only non-profit associations can obtain authoriza-
tions to operate a radio station, and stations can only broadcast 
include "mixed economy companies," that is, companies which are part governmental 
and part private. See PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 81. 
238 Law of July 29,1982, supra note 2, art. 46. Of the other four members, the presi-
dent is appointed by the H.A., one member is appointed by the National Audiovisual 
Communications Council, and two are appointed by employees of the S.N.P. 
239 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 45. 
240 Cousin, Droit des Nouveaux Medias: Le Secteur Public Garde La "Part du Lion," Com'7, 
Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 9. See also PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 82. 
241 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 79. A concession is a contract between a 
private party and a government agency under which the private party assumes a govern-
mental responsibility in return for the ability to benefit from the activity. See PROjET DE 
LOI, supra note 46, at 130. 
242 MOINOT COMMISSION, supra note 135, at 13. See also Chevalier, supra note 26, at 
563. 
243 See Chevalier, supra note 26, at 563; PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 129. 
244 See supra text accompanying notes 152-80. See also Kerever, supra note 22, at 72. 
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within a radius of thirty kilometers.245 Similarly, the ban on ad-
vertising on private radio continues.246 Certain provisions were 
changed, however, to accommodate the new organizations set up 
by the law, in particular the H.A., and to permit a unified ap-
proach to the entire field of audiovisual communications. 
Contrary to the recommendations of the Moinot Commission, 
the H.A. was not given complete authority to regulate private au-
diovisual communication.247 The Senate tried to give the H.A. 
broad power in this area, including the the power to prepare the 
schedule of obligations for private broadcasters and to divide ra-
dio frequencies. 248 The Minister of Communications labelled 
this attempt "extremely dangerous" and "contrary to demo-
cratic, republican and parliamentarian institutions. "249 
The final version of the law creates a shared responsibility be-
tween the H.A. and the government. This sharing reflects the 
division, recognized in the law, between the "container"-the 
telecommunications infrastructure-and the "contents"-the 
programs and services to be offered.250 The government retains 
control over the infrastructure while, with some exceptions, the 
H.A. issues authorizations to programmers.251 
There are two major elements to the infrastructure. The first 
is the radio airwaves. They must be under some control, accord-
ing to the Minister of Communication, because they constitute a 
scarce resource which requires regulation if it is to be put to the 
best possible use.252 The Minister has asserted that control must 
be state control, because the airwaves are a public good for which 
245 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 81. 
246 /d. The advertising ban was considered a temporary means of preserving the 
"equilibrium" between the written press and the audiovisual media. The written press 
had shown an interest in operating radio stations on its own, and the government felt 
that an "evolution" would occur as the written press became more involved with audio-
visual communications. This evolution would lead to an eventual sharing of advertising 
revenue among the media. For the present, though, "the actual balance is fragile. We 
want to continue to protect it, all in preparation for a necessary evolution." PROjET DE 
LOI, supra note 46, at 134. 
247 See Chevalier, supra note 26, at 567. 
248 /d. 
249 /d. 
250 See La Bataille du Cable, supra note 3, at 5. 
251 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2. Thus, for example, a private radio broad-
caster needs three separate authorizations before operation can begin. From the gov-
ernment, the broadcaster must get permission both to use a specific frequency, and to 
install a transmitter. /d. arts. 7-8. From the H.A., the broadcaster must receive the right 
to program. Id. art. 9. See also PRO JET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 13. 
252 PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 24. 
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the state must assume responsibility.253 
The second part of the infrastructure is the physical plant. 
For radio, that includes broadcasting equipment such as receiv-
ers and transmitters.254 For cable television, all equipment and 
facilities, which either cross the public domain or are situated on 
private property but are collectively owned, require state ap-
proval.255 This encompasses all of the cable hardware, from the 
head-end antennas to the cables which run down the street and 
into individual homes.256 
Access to both the cable and radio infrastrucure by program-
mers and other service providers (those who offer the "contents" 
of the audiovisual system) is governed by an entirely different 
framework.257 To bring about the "abolition of the program-
ming monopoly of the public service, "258 the law provides two 
basic ways to obtain access to the infrastructure: declaration and 
authorization.259 
The declaration is basically a formality, not requiring govern-
ment approval. Even the French written press is subject to this 
process, which consists of filling out some forms to "declare" 
one's existence.26o There are several limitations to access by dec-
laration. Only the providers of services such as videotext and 
teletext, and not video programmers, are able to use the declara-
253 !d. The public service organization, TDF, devises the plan for dividing the air-
waves into frequencies, Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 34, but the government 
ministers in charge of communications and the Post, Telephone, and Telegraph (PIT) 
give the authorizations to use a specific frequency. 1£1. art. 7. 
254 Id. art. 8. See PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 25. 
255 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 8. See PRO JET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 25. 
Reception of satellite programming by individually-owned antennas or satellite dishes 
cannot be controlled by the government. Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 8. The 
YIT minister declared that the freedom to receive broadcasts is a "public liberty" even 
if it conflicts with a government policy favoring cable television: "The choice one is able 
to make as to which technology is chosen does not absolutely require that one be so 
partisan as to outlaw the others." PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 17. 
256 There were several justifications given for placing the physical infrastructure 
under state control. For both radio and cable government intervention would purport-
edly ensure quality and uniformity: "Too many promoters are content today to install a 
network which is unreliable and inefficient." PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 25-26. For 
cable, an additional reason given for government involvement was the great expense of 
building a national cable system. See La Bataille du Cable, supra note 3, at 5. One govern-
ment minister argued that because there was insufficient private capital available in 
France to wire the country, it fell to the government to finance the system. !d. 
257 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 9. 
258 PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 26. 
259 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, arts. 77-78. 
260 !d. art. 77. See C. COLLIARD, supra note 17, at 484; PROJET DE LOI, supra note 46, 
at 126. 
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tion.261 Additionally, the service must be "interactive," or pro-
vide only information specifically requested by the consumer.262 
The other limitation on use of the declaration is that it is not 
available to anyone until January 1, 1986.263 Several reasons 
were given for this delay. First was the desire to provide suffi-
cient "start-up" time to avoid monopolization by a few existing 
service providers.264 Second, because the existing law does not 
adequately set out the ground rules for this new type of enter-
prise, a transition period was implemented to allow the legisla-
ture time to draft a more comprehensive law governing the legal 
and financial structure of audiovisual communications busi-
nesses.265 Until the legislature completes its job, all service prov-
iders labor under the same requirements as programmers and 
must receive authorizations before they can secure access to the 
communications infrastructure.266 
The H.A. issues some, but not all, authorizations. Specifi-
cally, the H.A. grants authorizations for local broadcast radio and 
local radio and television delivered by cable.267 The government 
issues authorizations for broadcast radio stations and cable pro-
gramming which are not "local."268 
The law is unclear as to who issues authorizations for those 
services which will eventually need only a declaration.269 Pre-
sumably, the H.A. will give an authorization if the services will be 
261 See Chevalier, supra note 26, at 561. The aim was to have a "liberal" law to en-
courage development of these new services. But see infra text accompanying notes 263-
66. 
262 PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 127. The precise services which will qualify were 
left unspecified in the law since "the technology evolves very quickly," and it is "impos-
sible to foresee all the devices which will be put at our disposal." [d. at 126. 
263 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 77. 
264 See Audiovisuel: la nouvelle donne, supra note 45, at 29. See also La Bataille du Cable, 
supra note 3, at 7-8. 
265 PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 127. 
266 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 78. Art. 78 governs "every audio-visual 
service not covered by" art. 77. 
267 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 77. 
268 According to art. 78, "The government issues all such permits other than those 
granted by the High Authority .... " There is one major difference in the way in which 
the H.A. and the government issue authorizations. Prior to granting an authorization, 
the H.A. must consult with a 22-member advisory body, consisting of representatives of 
the government, National Assembly, the written press, authorization holders and appli-
cants, and the public service companies. Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 87. The 
law does not require consultation by the government before it approves or denies an 
authorization. See PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 127-28. In the words of one com-
mentator: "This shows that the government intended to maintain complete control of 
broadcasting and the freedom to take advantage of the opportunity to open the national 
antennas to private initiative." Chevalier, supra note 26, at 569. 
269 See PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 128. 
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offered locally through a cable system. If a service is national, the 
government will handle authorization.270 
As with the 1981 radio law, the decision to grant an authoriza-
tion is not entirely within the discretion of either the H.A. or the 
government.271 The new law requires the issuing authority to 
take into account "geographical and sociocultural factors," as 
well as "the need to secure the free and pluralistic expression of 
ideas and trends of opinions."272 Also, any denial of an authori-
zation can be appealed to an administrative judge.273 
The authorizations, once granted, are for ten-year terms.274 
A three-year term had been proposed by the Assembly, but the 
longer period was chosen to ensure authorization holders a 
greater chance of profit.275 The law does provide, however, for 
revocation of authorizations in mid-term either for the "public 
interest" or if the holder fails to uphold the various obliga-
tions.276 Although the "public interest" provision could conceiv-
ably be used to make arbitrary withdrawals of authorizations, 
withdrawals can also be appealed to an administrative judge, who 
must determine the validity of the reasons for such a 
withdrawa1.277 
The responsibilities of authorization holders, detailed in a 
schedule of obligations, are similar to those imposed by the 1981 
law. Like the 1981 law, the 1982 law requires a statement of a 
holder's "main purpose" and the broadcast ofa weekly minimum 
amount of programming.278 There was much concern that any 
270 According to the Minister of Communication "the system of authorizations 
should be reserved for those situations where, due to scarcity, it is necessary to mediate 
between requests. The aim is, in effect, to institute a regime ofliberty which will find full 
expression when everyone will be able to have access to cable and when editorial rights 
common to all communications businesses will put each in a situation equal to the 
others. For the moment, authorizations are the general rule, given the necessity of pro-
tecting the fragile balance between the different means of communication." /d. at 125. 
271 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 87. 
272 Id. Of course, such language is "susceptible to many interpretations." Cheva-
lier, supra note 26, at 562 n.38. 
273 See PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 135. 
274 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 86. 
275 PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 138. 
276 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 86. The obligations imposed on private 
radio operators include the ban on advertising, see supra note 246 and accompanying 
text, and the requirement that no individual finance more than 25% of a station's 
budget. See PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 138, and infra text accompanying notes 288-
92. 
277 PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 138. 
278 Law of July 29,1982, supra note 2, at 83. See also supra text accompanying notes 
166-67,170. A weekly rather than a daily minimum was chosen to permit private radio 
stations greater "flexibility." See PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 135. 
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schedule of obligations would place private programmers in a re-
gime similar to that for public service companies, which would 
lead to direct government contro1.279 While the law does not 
specifY that the two types of schedules are different, proponents 
of the law have argued that there is a "very real legal distinction" 
between the technical requirements for authorization holders 
and the full requirements of public service.280 For example, a 
public service must respect general obligations of neutrality and 
even-handedness. Authorization holders are under no such duty. 
Another important distinction between private and govern-
ment programmers arises from the Erovisions of the law concern-· 
ing concentration of power. ArtrHe 80 of the law prohibits 
anyone from holding more than one authorization "of the same 
type."281 In other words, an association may have one authoriza-
tion for access to a cable television system and one for a local 
radio station, but not two of either.282 The rationale for this rule 
is "to stop the establishment of monopolies," especially by the 
regional press.283 
There is one major exception to this limitation. Public service 
companies and companies in which the state is the majority 
shareholder may receive an unlimited number of authoriza-
tions.284 While supporters have said that this is necessary to per-
mit these companies to "fulfill their missions," others have 
feared that this opens the door to reinstitution of the state mo-
nopoly, especially over the programs offered on the new cable 
networks.285 
279 E.g., Cousin, supra note 240, at 7-8 (The end of the government monopoly will 
not be an improvement if "almost all activity falls under public service."). 
280 See PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 130. See also Chevalier, supra note 26, at 561. 
281 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, at 80. There is no limit on the number of 
declarations for services which an individual may obtain under art. 77. 
282 PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 131. 
283 One supporter of the law explained: "Clearly, we do not want a press group 
which is able. . . to have a monopoly position in a region . . . to control at the same 
time in the same region. . . many cable television networks and a radio chain." PROjET 
DE LOI, supra note 46, at 131, quoting M. G. Fillard. By contrast, there is no limitation 
placed on those who distribute programs to, and produce programs for, many cable 
networks. See Bataille du Cable, supra note 3, at 24. 
284 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 80. An example of a company in which 
the state is the majority shareholder is SOFlRAD, a "mixed economy company," see 
supra note 237, which manages radio stations that broadcast into France but from 
outside the country. See PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 132. 
285 !d. at 131-132. 
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D. The Constitutional Council 
The constitutionality of the new law on audiovisual communi-
cations was challenged before the Constitutional Counci1.286 The 
first contention was that the law violated the right to "speak, 
write and publish freely" as guaranteed by article 11 of the Decla-
ration of the Rights of Man.287 The major provisions of the law 
attacked were: the "excessive limitation" placed on the right to 
use a declaration instead of an authorization;288 the imposition of 
public service responsibilities on private concessionaires who ob-
tain access to the broadcast television system;289 the schedule of 
obligations imposed on authorization holders;290 and the re-
quirement that cable systems built entirely on private property 
must obtain an authorization if they are "collectively owned."291 
The Constitutional Council ruled that these provisions did 
not violate the Constitution but rather represented a necessary 
balance, struck by Parliament, between free expression and the 
limits of technology. The law, according to the Council, fur-
thered the constitutional values of safeguarding the public order, 
respect for others, and the preservation of pluralistic expression, 
which the various means of audiovisual communications, "by 
their considerable influence," are capable of undermining.292 
The prohibition on advertising on private radio was also chal-
lenged.293 First, the Council rejected the argument that the ban 
violated the "freedom of business," stating that this freedom is 
not absolute and requires rules such as this one in order to ex-
ist.294 A second argument was that, because public serviCe radio 
stations were permitted to accept advertising, the ban on private 
stations violated the principle of equality before the law. The 
Council ruled that, because the same prohibition applied to all 
who held authorizations "of the same type," there was no uncon-
stitutional inequality. 295 
The Constitutional Council did find that one part of the law 
286 Decision of Con. const. of July 27, 1982, No. 82-141, Dalloz-Sirey,Jumprudence 
[D.S. Jur.]. For a discussion of the Constitutional Council, see supra note 106. 
287 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
288 See supra text accompanying notes 264-65. 
289 See supra text accompanying notes 282-83. 
290 See supra text accompanying note 278. 
291 See supra text accompanying note 255. 
292 Decision of Con. const. of July 27,1982, supra note 286. 
293 See supra text accompanying note 24~ 
294 Decision of Con. const. of July 27, 1:)82, supra note 286. 
295 Id. See supra text accompanying notes 218-19. 
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violated the principle of equality. The version of the law origi-
nally passed by Parliament gave the right of response only to nat-
ural persons and non-profit corporations.296 The Council held 
that "for profit" corporations were being discriminated against 
and ordered that all legal persons, individual and corporate, be 
accorded the right of response.297 
E. Evaluation of the Law 
The 1982 law on audiovisual communications was intended to 
"reinvent" the French communications law. 298 It was designed 
to end the government's monopoly on programming and affirm 
the freedom of audiovisual communications.299 Furthermore, 
the law was intended to institute a "clear separation" between 
political powers and communications.soo 
Opponents of the law charged that the government remained 
firmly in control of all electronic communications. They argued 
that the "tentacular" public service, the governmental monopoly 
over the infrastructure and the "privileged situation" of the pub-
lic service companies over private broadcasters gave the state "all 
the means and all the power."SOl As one critic stated: "The law 
has 110 articles-two are for liberty, 108 are for regulating it."s02 
Actually, the law, like all legislative compromises, contains 
both positive and negative elements. The few years since the 
passage of the law on audiovisual communications have revealed 
some of its strengths and weaknesses. 
296 See PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 22. 
297 Decision of Con. const. of July 27, 1982, supra note 286. See also Law of July 29, 
1982, supra note 2, art. 6. 
298 La Battaille du Cable, supra note 3, at 1. The Minister of Communication said that 
this reform "seeks to adapt our law to reality." PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 13. 
299 PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 13. See also La Bataille du Cable, supra note 3, at 5 
(the 1982 law transforms "administrative logic" into a regimen able to take "diverse 
forms"); Chevalier, supra note 26, at 561 (the law raises "new possibilities for free 
expression"). 
soo La Bataille du Cable, supra note 3, at 32. See also PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 27 
(legislative intent was to "ensure the independence of the radio-television public service 
from political power.") 
SOl Chevalier, supra note 26, at 558. See Cousin, supra note 240, at 7 ("Liberties are 
at stake in France where the excessive domination by the public sector of communica-
tions constitutes a menace .... "). 
302 Berger, Michael D'Omano: Rapport SUT La Television Socialiste, Le Figaro, Apr. 9, 
1983, at 69; Durieux & Cojean, supra note 198, at 15 (the "potentialities" of the law are 
"largely erased by the laborious setting up ofliberties); Chevalier, supra note 26, at 561 
(the contradiction between Article I's freedom of communication and the regimes of 
public service and authorizations, creates more a "right of expression" than a "true 
freedom of audiovisual communication."). 
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For example, the H.A. began quite inauspiciously, with the 
Socialists in power, appointing six of the nine members.303 Of 
greater concern was the fact that several of the appointees had 
close personal ties with the Administration.304 
As a "protective screen" between the government and audio-
visual communications, though, the H.A. has received mixed re-
views.305 It is generally conceded that the H.A. was able to 
ensure equal time for all candidates during the municipal elec-
tions.306 Additionally, the H.A. has opposed the government on 
the sensitive issue of the right to respond to general government 
statements on political issues and argued that an open debate be-
tween representatives of majority and opposition parties should 
follow such pronouncements.307 
The primary complaint about the H.A. involves its apparent 
inability to sever the "umbilical cord" between government and 
communications and ensure objectivity and impartiality.30s 
There is near universal agreement that the pro-government bias 
of the public service continued unabated even after the passage 
of law. "[T]he cold hand of the state, although gloved in the 
H.A. and the nominal independence of the TDF, shows no sign 
of loosening its grip on French telecommunications .... "309 
There are frequent complaints that the news carried on the 
public service stations favors the government's perspective; sto-
ries harmful to the government's interests are not covered and 
critics of the government are kept off the public channels.310 Ad-
303 The members were quickly termed "political appointees." D. GRAY & C. GRANT, 
supra note 38, at 47. 
304 For example, one appointee was an "intimate friend" of President Mitterand, 
another worked on his election campaign. See Berger, supra note 302, at 70. 
305 Chevalier, supra note 26, at 566. 
306 See Durieux & Cojean, supra note 198, at 15. 
307 See Le Premier Rapport Annuel de La Haute Authorite, Le Monde, Oct. 26, 1983, at 15. 
Because the H.A. seems occassionally willing to stand up to the government, one Sena-
tor from the opposition proposed giving H.A. control over all public service societies. 
/d. 
30S See Todd, supra note 32, at 4; Berger, supra note 302, at 70. There have also 
been charges that the government has received more air time than opposition political 
parties. See Le Premier Rapport Annuel de La Haute Authorite, supra note 307. 
309 D. GRAY & C. GRANT, supra note 38, at 77. For a discussion of the TDF, see supra 
notes 296-98 and accompanying text. A Canadian journalist, Denise Bombadier, had 
predicted in 1975 that if the left took power in France, it would find it difficult to resist 
the temptation to make the public service monopoly "sing its song." Morand & Valter, 
supra note 25, at 60. 
310 See Berger, supra note 302, at 69 (the majority parties take five to seven times 
more television air time than the opposition); Todd, supra note 32, at 6 (news is not 
"objective"); Television: Pour "FR3", Cette Femme est Dangereuse, Le Figaro, Mar. 17-23, 
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ditionally, some charge that public service employees who do not 
agree politically with the state are either fired or removed from 
positions of responsibility. 311 
Nonetheless, the H.A. has served an important purpose. De-
spite the continued involvement of the government in communi-
cations, the H.A. has been able to limit some of the government's 
power.312 This has resulted in general fairness to all political 
parties during election campaigns and remarkably few com-
plaints over the awarding of authorizations to private broadcast-
ers.313 Even if the H.A. cannot guarantee complete freedom for 
all audiovisual communications, it is of great symbolic impor-
tance to have the H.A. as a "necessary dike" keeping, to some 
extent, the power of the government from washing over all 
communications.314 
As for the programming offered by the public service itself, 
there has been no decrease in the widespread condemnation of 
its poor quality. Surveys reveal that over two-thirds of the popu-
lation is dissatisfied with French television,315 which offers what 
has been termed "a menu almost universally acknowledged as 
being dull and unappetizing."316 
A quite different reaction has greeted the programs offered 
on private radio stations. It was generally reported that listeners 
are "enthusiastic" about the wide variety of new and specialized 
programming.317 Groups as diverse as the Boy Scouts, the Por-
tuguese-French community, the environmentalists and the anar-
1982, at 124 (int'l ed.) (popular television star kept off FR3 because of her political 
views). 
311 See Berger, supra note 302, at 69; Todd, supra note 32, at 6. 
312 See Chevalier, supra note 26, at 568. 
313 There were some complaints over the sharing of frequencies. In particular, Fre-
quence Gaie, the homosexual station, interrupted its programming for 48 hours to pro-
test the H.A.'s order requiring it to share a frequency with Radio-Libertaire, the station 
for anarchists, and Radio-Verte, the ecologists' station. Frequence Gaie claimed that 
this would cause listener confusion. Frequence Caie, Le Monde,July 22, 1983, at 24, col. 
2. 
314 Durieux & Cojean, supra note 198, at 15. 
315 See La Bataille du Cable, supra note 3, at 29. 
316 D. GRAY & C. GRANT, supra note 39, at 97. See also Todd, supra note 32, at 4 
(French television is often "mediocre"); Bercoff, Un Service qui N'Existe Pas, Le Monde, 
May 4, 1984, 1, col. 3 (television suffers because it only searches for the lowest common 
denominator); Berger, supra note 302, at 72 (American television "pleases" more then 
French television "to judge by Dallas "). 
317 While many listeners prefer the programming on private radio stations to that 
offered on the public service stations, a survey conducted in July, 1983, found that 61% 
of radio listeners preferred the public service stations for news. Guigon, Radios Libres: 
l'Onde de Choc, Le Point, July 4, 1983, at 66. 
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chists have obtained air time.31S Over 800 stations have been 
authorized by the H.A.319 In Paris, in fact, the number of broad-
casters so exceeded the number of allotted frequencies that each 
frequency is shared by several different groupS.320 Thus, the plu-
ralism promised by the law has come not from the public service, 
which is charged with guaranteeing pluralism, but from the 800 
private parties with access to the airwaves.321 
The prohibition on advertising, however, has caused wide-
spread difficulty. Some stations have been able to deal with the 
problem of funding through creative means. For example, one 
station which specializes in accordion dance music staged fund-
raising balls, while "Frequence Gaie," the homosexual station, 
has been paid for by listener contributions.322 Other stations 
have not been so fortunate. Some have turned to illegal "hidden 
advertising," while others have been unable to raise sufficient 
capital to survive.323 Accordingly, on April 4, 1984, the govern-
ment announced that it would seek a new statute permitting ad-
vertising on private radio stations.324 While many endorsed this 
plan, others feared the loss of the "non-profit spirit," and the 
possible replacement of local stations by national networks.325 
The 1982 law also did not resolve all of the questions con-
cerning the regulation of cable television. The development of 
the French cable television system was impeded by the inability 
of the government t() devise a plan, consistent with the law, for 
sharing responsibility. The major reasons cited for the almost 
two-year delay were the need to develop adequate financial re-
sources for the project, the concern for the effect of cable on 
other media, and cable's "political consequences."326 
31S See Freedom Without Commercials, The Economist, Sept. 3, 1983, at 41; Frequence Gaie, 
supra note 313, at 24. 
319 See Guignon, supra note 317, at 66. In August,I982, more than a year after the 
1982 Law was enacted, the Government began closing down unlicensed radio operators. 
Opposition party leaders called the police raids on these stations, "the Saint 
Batholomew's Day massacre of the airwaves." See Durieux & Cojean, supra note 2m, at 
15; Freedom Without Commercials, supra note 318, at 41. 
320 See Freedom Without Commercials, supra note 318, at 41. See also supra note 313. 
321 See supra notes 320-22 and accompanying text. 
322 See Freedom Without Commercials, supra note 318, at 42. 
323 !d. 
324 See Graret, La Bataille de la Publicite est Commencee, Le Nouvel Economiste, Apr. 16, 
1983, at 50; Mitterand Sur la Defensive, Le Figaro, Apr. 5, 1982, at 1. 
325 E.g., Graret, supra note 324, at 50. There was also some concern since 43% of 
the audience of the private stations, according to one survey, said they were attracted by 
the lack of advertisements. Guigon, supra note 317, at 65. 
326 Lacon, Le Plan de Cablage, Le Monde, Mar. 2, 1984, at 24. These "political conse-
quences" of cable television included the fact that each cable system would offer viewers 
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Finally, on May 3, 1984, the cabinet ratified a plan for the cre-
ation of local cable networks.327 While the framework of the plan 
recognizes the split between infrastructure and services, there is 
governmental involvement (either national or local) in the opera-
tion of both. The government-run PTT328 (the national postal, 
telephone and telegraph company) will control most of the infra-
structure.329 The PTT will plan, construct and own the entire 
cable network except for the "head-end".330 The TDF,331 the 
public service organization which is responsible for the technical 
tranmission of broadcasting, will be in charge of the head-end 
equipment and facilities.332 Thus, the TDF "controls the recep-
tion of programmes from terrestrial or satellite transmitters, allo-
cates frequency bands, and is responsible for the transmission of 
all programming. "333 
The party that decides which services and programs will be 
carried on each cable system will not be a private entity. Rather, 
each "cable operator" will be a company whose shareholders 
constitute a "subtle melange" of state, municipal and private in-
terests,334 known as an SLEC (Societe locale d' exploitation 
commerciale).335 
The plan allows each SLEC to determine its own member-
a wide range of programs and services, "not controlled by the state." Id. Also delayed 
was the planned start of the fourth television channel, Canal Plus. This channel, con-
ceived as a "pay channel" requiring subscribers to purchase a decoder as well as pay a 
monthly subscription fee, was scheduled to begin operation on Christmas Day, 1984. See 
Trois Nouveaux Programmes de Television, Le Monde, Oct. 27, 1983, at 32; Billiard, TV: le 
Marecage, Le Point,July 18,1983, at 67. 
327 See French Government opts for Fiberoptics Systems, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, May 14, 
1984, at 36. 
328 Le Ministere du Poste, Telephones et Telegraphes. 
329 See supra text accompanying notes 255-56. See also French Government opts for Fiber-
optics Systems, supra note 330, at 36; Cable and Electronics have a Bright Future, INTERMEDIA, 
May, 1984, at 3-4. 
330 "Head-end" is defined as the "general term for the array of equipment control-
ling the central reception and transmission of signals in a [cable] network. [It] consists 
of electronics for receiving, converting, decoding, amplifying, filtering and transmitting 
signals as necessary." D. GRAY & C. GRANT, supra note 38, at 9. 
331 Telediffusion de France. See supra notes 194,235 and accompanying text. 
332 See La Bataille du Cable, supra note 3, at 9; D. GRAY & C. GRANT, supra note 38, at 
102. 
333 D. GRAY & C. GRANT, supra note 38, at 102. 
334 Le Boucher, Television Cable: le Plan est Pret, Le Monde, Apr. 28, 1984, at I, col. 3. 
335 See La Bataille du Cable, supra note 3, at 6; D. GRAY & C. GRANT, supra note 38, at 
102. The 1982 Law does not provide for, or even mention, SLEC's. Most observers 
believe, however, that the law is "flexible" enough to permit their functioning. See 
Lacon, Les Debuts de la Teledistribution, Le Monde, May 20, 1984, at 32; La Bataille du Cable, 
supra note 3, at 9. 
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ship, subject to certain ground rules.336 For example, while gov-
ernmental and private interests will be represented in each 
SLEC, no single interest may constitute a majority.337 The mu-
nicipal government where the cable system is located, however, 
will have veto power over actions taken by the SLEC.338 The fact 
that the president of each SLEC must be a local elected official, 
either a mayor or a member of the regional governing council, 
adds another element of local governmental contro1.339 The 
principal goals of the SLEC structure are "to keep the company 
local and to prevent industrialists from building empires.34o To 
further ensure localism, cable networks will be limited to serving 
areas smaller than 36 miles.341 The aim of avoiding private mo-
nopolies will also be supported by the restriction on private in-
volvement in SLEC's: no private party may participate in more 
than one SLEC.342 
Under the plan, the SLEC must be closely involved with nu-
merous national governmental entities. The SLEC rents the 
right to use the infrastructure from the PTT, contracts with the 
TDF to operate the head-end facilities, and receives an authoriza-
tion to operate from the H.A.343 
Ultimately, though, it will be the SLEC who decides which 
programmers are allowed onto the cable network. This means 
that, as the president of the H.A. noted, "it is local officials who 
. . . are entrusted with managing the new cable systems, it is up 
to them to assure the new liberty.344 
336 See Cable and Electronics Have a Bright Future, supra note 329, at 4. 
337 Id. 
338 /d. 
339 /d. See also Le Boucher, supra note 334, at 12. 
340 See Cable and Electronics Have a Bright Future, supra note 329, at 4. 
341 See French Government opts for Fiberoptics Systems, supra note 327, at 36. The 1982 
Law did not specify exactly how large an area could be served by cable and still be 
considered "local" (unlike the 30 kilometer limit for local private radio specified in art. 
81). See PRO JET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 36. 
342 Law of july 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 80. The public service societies will be 
able to participate in more than one SLEC. Thus, they could playa major role in the 
programming on cable as well as on broadcast television. See Le Nouveau "Monsieur 
Cables" Devra Faire Dialoguer L'Etat et les Collectives Locales, Le Monde, jan. 22, 1983, at 24. 
343 Law of july 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 78. See La Bataille du Cable, supra note 3, at 
8-9. The H.A. will also impose various obligations on each SLEC, such as respect for 
pluralism. But cJ. supra text accompanying notes 282-83 (supporters of the law suggest 
that authorization holders will not be subject to public service obligations, only technical 
requirements). By the time the government unveiled its final plans for the cable in May, 
1984, over 130 groups had applied for authorizations. See Cable and Electronics Have a 
Bright Future, supra note 329, at 4. 
344 La Bataille du Cable, supra note 3, at 3. See also Le Nouveau "Monsieur Cables" Devra 
Faire Dialoguer l'Etat et les Collectives Locales, supra note 342, at 24 (because of the involve-
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Thus, the national government has kept complete control 
over the cable infrastructure and has granted local governments 
great power over the programming.345 While this does bring 
about some much needed decentralization of power,346 it also 
means that pressure can be exerted by some governmental entity 
at every section of the cable network. 
In sum, the audiovisual law created what has been aptly called 
a "conditional liberty."347 Private parties finally have access to 
certain forms of electronic communication, but always under the 
watchful eye of the state. The law has modified the ways in which 
government can exercise its power, but the freedom to communi-
cate remains a "faucet," which the government is able to open 
and close.348 
The new law neither guarantees total freedom of communica-
tion nor condemns the French citizenry to a despotically con-
trolled communications network. Rather, it creates the 
possibility, but not the guarantee, that democratic pressures and 
the competition created by private programmers in the market-
place of entertainment and ideas will lead to true pluralism for 
French electronic mass communications.349 
v. BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS: PRIVATE MONOPOLY VS. 
GOVERNMENT DOMINATION 
Americans have much to learn from the history of French 
telecommunications law. Certainly there are similarities between 
the two democracies, each with a dedication to freedom of 
speech spanning almost two centuries.350 Differences in history, 
ment of local officials, "there will not be a lack of delicate problems of political 
pluralism. "). 
345 See supra text accompanying notes 338-39. 
346 E.g., PROjET DE LOI, supra note 46, at 59; Chevalier, supra note 26, at 574. 
347 An 11, supra note 198, at I. 
348 Cousin, supra note 240, at 10. See Chevalier, supra note 26, at 565 (While the state 
can still intervene in communications, the law "modifies the context in which this super-
visory power can be exercised."); Audiovisuelle: La nouvelle donne, supra note 45, at 35 (The 
law will require the government to engage in "delicate balancing."). 
349 In the words of one commentator, "France in the 1980's will have the radio and 
television it deserves and its political and social system is ready to accept." Tarle, supra 
note 25, at 23. One hopeful sign appeared at the end of January, 1985, when President 
Mitterand announced a plan for the creation of 80 private local television stations. See 
Channel 80, The Economist, Jan. 26, 1985, at 40. 
350 Compare U.S. Const. amend.I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press ... ") with art. XI of the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen of Aug. 26, 1789 ("The free communication of thoughts and 
opinions is one of the most precious rights of man; every citizen may therefore speak, 
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culture and legal structure have, however, created vastly different 
frameworks for the law of communications in each country. 
Through the study of the French experience, both by examining 
proposals which have yet to be tried in the United States and by 
considering the basic principles and assumptions of a foreign 
country, one can gain fresh insight into U.S. telecommunications 
law.351 
Perhaps the most important cultural difference between 
France and the United States, in terms of communications law, is 
the different national perspectives on the role of elected officials 
and the judiciary. The French view, evolving from the French 
Revolution, places primary faith in majority rule, while dis-
trusting the power of appointed judges to thwart the popular 
Will.352 By contrast, the American system is one of checks and 
balances, whereby the courts in their application of the Constitu-
tion are expected to protect the people from majoritarian 
abuse.353 
One result of this difference is that, for better or worse, the 
French President and Parliament have been relatively involved in 
the regulation of electronic mass communications. In some ar-
eas, this intervention has prevented domination of the airwaves 
by small groups of private individuals. Unfortunately, however, 
rather than creating a free marketplace of ideas with numerous 
vendors, the French government has reserved the largest stand in 
the market for itself. 
Americans must proceed with caution, therefore, in consider-
ing the French system of communications regulation. There are 
some concepts which cannot cross the Atlantic, while others re-
flect a shared belief in pluralism and freedom. 
Traditionally, both American and French theorists have 
agreed on the desirability of fostering diversity in mass communi-
cations. Throughout the history of French telecommunications 
regulation runs the theme that government must intervene in or-
der to prevent the development of private communications mo-
write and publish freely, provided he shall be liable for the abuse of this freedom in such 
cases as are determined by law" (translated in FRENCH LAw, supra note 9, at 3). 
351 See Tunc, Preface to O.KAHN, C. LEVY & B. RUDDEN, A SOURCE-BoOK ON FRENCH 
LAw, xi (1979) ("By a well-known phenomenon, consideration of a foreign system fos-
ters 'reflection' on one's own."). 
352 PRESS LAws IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES 342 (P. Lahav ed. 1985). 
353 /d. See also L. TRIBE, THE CONSTITIITIONAL PROTECOON OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
583 (1978) (In the arena offree expression, the role of "the judicial branch is to protect 
dissenters from a majority's tyrrany .... "). 
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nopolies. The fear is that, without regulation, communications 
empires would rise up and dominate public opinion, squelching 
pluralistic expression. To prevent this from occurring, numer-
ous barriers have been erected.354 
The United States has applied the First Amendment theory 
that "the widest possible dissemination of information from di-
verse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the 
public. "355 The Supreme Court has recognized that "the greater 
the number of owners in a market, the greater the possibility of 
achieving diversity of program and service viewpoints."356 
In pursuit of diversity, the U.S. has established a wide variety 
of structural regulations to ensure the greatest number of owners 
within the mass media. For example, newspapers are barred 
from owning a television station within their area of circulation; 
broadcasters cannot own cable television systems which serve 
their area of broadcast.357 Similarly, the F.C.C. has prohibited 
"duopolies," that is, two television, two FM or two AM stations 
which serve the same area and are owned by the same person.358 
In recent years, however, the presumption that diversity of 
ownership should be preferred over concentrated ownership has 
been attacked as an unnecessary inhibition of the "normal mech-
anisms of the marketplace."359 In fact, Federal Communications 
Commission Chairman Mark Fowler has stated that those argu-
ing for restrictions on concentration "should have to demon-
strate that a limit on ownership bears a close relationship to an 
identifiable harm. "360 
As the Supreme Court has noted, however, "the possible ben-
efits of competition do not lend themselves to detailed fore-
354 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 80. See also supra text accompanying notes 
343-45. 
355 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). See also Terminello v. 
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4 (1949) ("The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of 
ideas and programs is. . . one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from the totali-
tarian regimes."). 
356 F.C.C. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795 
(1978). 
357 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.501(a), 76.636(c) (1983). The constitutionality of the ban on 
newspapers owning television stations which operate in the same market was upheld in 
F.C.C v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 802. ("The regula-
tions are a reasonable means of promoting the public interest in diversified mass 
communications. . . . "). 
358 47 C.F.R. § 73.636(a) (1983). 
359 Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEX. L. REV. 
207, 210 (1982). 
360 /d. at 246. 
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cast."361 Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning, the F.C.C. 
somewhat cursorily determined in a recent decision that even 
though the total number of speakers may decline, there are 
"public interest benefits from the multiple ownership of stations" 
on a regional and nationalleve1.362 Accordingly, the F.C.C. has 
eliminated rules which previously prevented common ownership 
of three television, AM or FM stations where two were located 
within 100 miles of each other and which discouraged ownership 
of three television stations or two VHF stations in the 50 largest 
television markets.363 
The problem with this momentum towards industry concen-
tration can be seen in the rationale given for the F.C.C.'s aborted 
attempt to repeal its primary limitation on multiple ownership of 
broadcast stations, the 7-7-7 rule.364 The F.C.C. argued that lim-
iting the number of different viewpoints expressed on television 
news would not limit "viewpoint diversity" because viewers 
"could tum to an alternative medium if they became dissatisfied 
with their current one."365 The alternatives, according to the 
F.C.C., include not only electronic communications such as radio 
and cable television, but newspapers, magazines and books.366 
However, the F.C.C. fails to recognize that a "satisfied" viewer is 
not necessarily a "well-informed" viewer. A person may well en-
joy a news program, yet be unaware that important issues are 
being ignored. While "letting the market do it" may permit 
slanted appeals to majoritarian opinions and prejudices, "the 
'public interest' in broadcasting clearly encompasses the presen-
tation of vigorous debate of controversial issues of importance 
and concern to the public. "367 
The F.C.C. is also misguided in its broad description of a 
361 F.C.C v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86, 96 (1953) 
362 Repeal of the "Regional Concentration of Control" Provisions of the Commis-
sion's Multiple Ownership Rules, 55 R.R. 2d 1389, 1398 (1984). See also Amendment of 
§ 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and 
Television Broadcast Stations, 56 R.R. 859, 879-89 (1984) [hereinafter Amendment of 7-7-
7 Sule]. These benefits were said to include economies of scale and permitted success-
ful station owners to own more stations. 
363 Amendment of 7-7-7 Rule, supra note 362, at 882-83. 
364 [d. at 865. This proposal was rescinded in Amendment § 73.3555 of the Com-
mission's Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast 
Stations, 56 R.R. at 887 (1984), in response to heavy Congressional opposition. E.g., 
Wirth, Why the "Rule of 12" Hurts Competition, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26,1984, Sec. 3, at 2, col. 
3. 
365 Amendment of 7-7-7 Rule, supra note 362, at 865. 
3661d. 
367 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 385 (1969). 
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competitive "market" for news and information. Television to-
day has no real competition. The Supreme Court has recognized 
that "the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive 
presence in the lives of all Americans. "368 In fact, a study cited 
by the F.C.C. itself showed that 64% of Americans list television 
as their primary source of news.369 
A final error in the F.C.C.'s analysis is that it undervalues "the 
'public interest' in diversification of the mass communications 
media."370 We must return to the fundamental principle that, in 
the words of the French law, citizens "are entitled to free and 
pluralistic audio-visual communication."371 This right is pre-
mised on the belief, central as well to the First Amendment, that 
the truth is more likely to come from several speakers than from 
one.372 As the F.C.C. stated itself in 1970: 
Weare of the view that 60 different licensees are more 
desirable than 50, and even 51 are more desirable than 50. 
In a rapidly changing social climate, communication of 
ideas is vital. If a city has 60 frequencies available but they 
are licensed to only 50 different licensees, the number of 
sources for ideas is not maximized. It might be the 51st 
licensee that would become the communication channel 
for a solution to a severe local social crisis. No one can say 
that present licensees are broadcasting everything worth-
while that can be communicated.373 
One aspect of French regulation of telecommunications 
which has particular relevance to the U.S. is the mandated divi-
sion between the infrastructure of a communications network 
and the programs and services carried on that network.374 This is 
368 F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). 
369 The Commission, in describing why the survey results totaled over 100% (in 
addition to the 64% who listed television, 18% listed radio as their primary news source 
and 44% listed newspapers), stated that it "implies that many people actually use more 
than one medium as a news source." [d. However, it does not imply that they use more 
than one medium as a news source for news on the same topic. For example, a local news-
paper may be the source of local news, while network television is the source for na-
tional and world news. Thus, there is not necessarily "competition" between these news 
sources. 
370 F.C.C. v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 799 
(1978). 
371 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 2. 
372 The First Amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be 
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. 
To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all." Associated 
Press v. United States, 52 F. Supp. 366, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aifd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
373 Matter of Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership, 22 F.C.C.2d 306,311 (1970). 
374 See supra text accompanying notes 369-70, 447-70. 
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especially applicable to cable television. Recognizing both the 
inherent differences between the "container" and its "contents" 
and the need to divide responsibility for this important means of 
communication, the French have established a system in which 
different groups have responsibility for laying the wires and se-
lecting the programming. 
In the U.S., by contrast, the cable television operator controls 
both the infrastructure and the programming.375 Thus, the cable 
operator, who is given a license by the city or state government 
to build what will be the only cable system in a particular area, 
also has the freedom to decide, unilaterally, which programs will 
and will not be carried over each of the 36, 54 or 70 channels on 
the system.376 As one commentator has observed: 
A cable system is a mixture of pluralism and monopoly. It 
has elements of each. It'has numerous channels that can 
be programmed by many separate producers. Video pro-
duction is an intensely competitive business. However, 
one element of the cable system is a bottleneck monopoly, 
namely the physical cable. . . . From a social point of 
view, the promise of cable lies in the pluralism made possi-
ble by its unlimited number of channels. From the 
programmer-cablecaster's point of view, this may be its 
horror. A program producer gains from the limitations on 
compeition that compel vast audiences, because of the lack 
of alternatives, to watch programs of moderate interest. 
But for the society, the advantage of cable is that it can 
create for video that kind of diversity that exists in print.377 
When the cable operator in control of the bottleneck facility is 
also the programmer, the conflict between the societal interest in 
diversity and the programmer's interest in maximizing the share 
of the viewing audience intensifies. For example, the four largest 
services offering pay programming to cable operators serve 90% 
of pay subscribers and are owned by the three largest cable oper-
ators.378 These operators have a particular economic interest in 
375 See, e.g., Nadel, COMCAR: A Marketplace Cable Television Franchise Structure, 20 
HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 541, 54749 (1983). 
376 Of the more than 4,200 cable television systems in operation, fewer than ten 
compete with another cable system for subscribers. Dawson, How Safe Is Cable's Natural 
Monopoly?, CABLEVISION, June 1, 1981, at 340. Cable television has been alternately 
termed a "natural monopoly," Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 
F.2d at 1379, and a "natural oligopoly," Meyerson, The First Amendment and the Cable 
Television operator: An Un protective Shield Against Public Access Requirements, 4 COMM/ENT LJ. 
1, 10 (1981), 
377 I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 168-72 (1983). 
378 Home Box Office (the largest pay movie service, with 13,500,000 subscribers) 
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limiting competition to their programs, and hence in limiting the 
diversity of programs available on their systems. 
The Supreme Court has noted that "evidence of specific 
abuses by common owners is difficult to compile."379 In the rela-
tively short history of cable television, however, there have been 
numerous examples of just such abuses. For example, when 
cable companies have instituted pay movie services, they have 
frequently first removed competing movie services from their 
systems.380 Similarly, one cable operator refused to carry a chan-
nel offering 24-hour news, not because of a lack of subscriber 
interest, but so that it could offer its own news channel in-
stead.381 These anti-competitive impulses would not exist if 
there were a clear division between the cable network and the 
cable network's programming. If the cable operator did not con-
trol programming, it would have a strong economic incentive to 
offer the most diversified programming possible in order to best 
compete.382 
In 1984, Congress created a modest division. The Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984 permits the cable operator 
to control most of the channels on the system, but reserves some 
channels for those not affiliated with the operator.383 Any cable 
system with 36 or more channels must lease a set percentage of 
those channels to non-affiliated programmers.384 Additionally, 
and Cinemax (the fourth largest service, with 2,700,000 subscribers) are owned by 
American Television and Communications Corp. (the country's second largest cable tel-
evision operator). The second and third largest pay services, Showtime and The Movie 
Channel (with 5,000,000 and 3,100,000 subscribers respectively), are owned jointly by 
the sixth and tenth largest cable television operators, Warner Amex Cable Communica-
tions, Inc. and Viacom Cablevision. See Cable Service Subscriber Count, CABLEVISION, July 
16, 1984, at 62; Top 100 Cable MSO's, CABLEVISloN,June 11, 1984, at 222. 
379 National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 797 (quoting FCC v. 
RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86, 96 (1953». 
380 When the Times Mirror Cable TV, Inc., the sixth largest cable television opera-
tor, started its own movie service, Spotlight, it removed Home Box Office and Showtime 
from its systems. See In the Matter of Cable Leased Channel Access on the New, Large 
Capacity Systems, Petition of Henry Geller & Ira Baron before the Federal Communica-
tions System, 10 (Oct. 9, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Petition of Geller & Baron]. 
381 See Nadel, supra note 375, at 548, n. 40. Similarly, when Cable News Network 
(CNN), in an attempt to get cable subscribers to ask their cable systems to carry CNN, 
offered a day of programming on another channel, more than a dozen cable systems 
blocked out that channel for the day. See Petition of Geller & Baron, supra note 381, at 
11. 
382 See I. POOL, supra note 377, at 175-76. 
383 47 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (1982). 
384 If a system has between 36 and 54 activated channels, the cable operator must 
set aside 10% of those channels (channels whose use is mandated by federal law for 
carriage of broadcast signals are subtracted from the base number of channels). Opera-
tors of systems with more than 55 activated channels must set aside 15% of such chan-
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the cities which grant cable franchises are permitted to require 
that other channels be set aside for the public on a "first come, 
first serve" basis (so-called "public access").385 The cable opera-
tor is not permitted to exercise any editorial control over any 
programming on either type of channel. 386 
The cable access requirements supplant the power of the sin-
gle entity who manages the infrastructure to control all of the 
system's programming and create instead a right for many pro-
grammers to offer their services. The Cable Act creates a con-
tent-neutral, structural regulatory scheme designed to increase 
diversity in programming.387 Accordingly, the Act furthers the 
interests of the First Amendment by presupposing that "right 
conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of 
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection."388 
This type of structural regulation which increases the number 
of speakers without silencing any speaker or regulating content, 
should be encouraged.389 As the Supreme Court has held: "It is 
the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve the uninhibited 
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather 
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it 
be by the government itself or a private licensee."390 
Without denigrating the need to prevent private monopolies, 
however, it is fair to say that the French experience underscores 
the wisdom of the U.S. Supreme Court's dualistic warning. The 
history of French telecommunications law demonstrates unmis-
takably that government, however well-intentioned, simply can-
not resist the temptation to control communications if given the 
opportunity.391 One obvious remedy for government interfer-
ence with communications is to establish a watchdog agency. 
nels, and systems with more than 100 channels must include the must-carry channels in 
their base number. [d. § 612. 
385 [d. § 611. 
386 /d. §§ 611(e), 612(c)(2). According to the legislative history of the Act, "[w]ith 
regard to the access requirement, cable operators act as a conduit." H.R. Rep. No. 98-
934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1984). 
387 See National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 801-02. 
388 United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aifd, 
326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
389 See Price, Taming Red Lion: The First Amendment and Structural Approaches to Media 
Regulation, 31 FED. COM. L.J. 215, 222 (1979) ("[A] structural approach is preferable to 
an approach to diversity which involves content regulation.") 
390 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 
U.S. 367, 390. 
391 See supra text accompanying notes 311-14. See also D. GRAY & C. GRANT, supra 
note 38, at 97. 
Lessons from the French Communications Law 145 
The Federal Communications Commission in the United States 
and the High Authority in France both serve this function.392 
They both police the ainvaves to ensure that broadcasters oper-
ate in a manner which serves the public interest. Both the Com-
missioners and the "nine sages" of the H.A. are, however, 
appointed by those holding political power.393 This selection 
process, therefore, raises the continuing specter of political inter-
ference with the operations of private radio and television sta-
tions. As Professor Mark Yudof asked: "Can the 'referee' be fair-
minded when it has such an interest in the outcome of the 
process ?"394 
The relationship between the President of the United States 
and the F.C.C. ensures a unity of interests between the "referee" 
and the executive branch. The F.C.C. commissioners are ap-
pointed for seven-year terms by the President, who also selects 
the chairman.395 Appointees are not only likely to share the views 
of the person who appointed them, "they may also feel a sense of 
loyalty to the President."396 Moreover, those selected by a for-
mer President but who wish to continue and serve another term 
"must remember that they are also reappointed by the 
President.' '397 
Once the F.C.C. has been "influenced" by those in political 
power, it is quite easy for the F.C.C. to "influence" the decisions 
of broadcasters. The F.C.C. has the power to either deny a re-
newal or revoke any license.398 In the words of one broadcaster: 
"W l' d' b th FCC "399 e lVe or Ie... y e . . . gun. 
392 For example, both the F.C.C. and H.A. license private broadcasters. Compare 47 
U.S.C. § 301 with Art. 17 of the Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2. Both can revoke 
licenses if the station operator fails to comply with the agency's requirements. Compare 
47 U.S.C. § 312 with Art. 83 of the Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2. While the F.C.C. 
regulates "as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires," 47 U.S.C. § 303, the 
H.A. is charged with "safeguarding the independence" of the public service and secur-
ing "the free and pluralistic expression of ideas," Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, arts. 
12,82. 
393 See 47 U.S.C. § 154(a); Art. 23 of the Law of July 29, 1982 supra note 2. See also 
An II, supra note 198, at 15 (describing H.A. members as "nine sages"). 
394 M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 93 (1983). 
395 47 U.S.C. § 154(a). The current chair of the Corporation for Public Broadcast-
ing was "a leading campaign organizer" for the President. Reagan Aide Heads Public 
Broadcasting, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1984, at AI, col. 3. 
396 R. ELLMORE, BROADCASTING LAw AND REGULATION 26 (1982). 
397 !d. An additional source of potential influence is the power held by the White 
House over the F.C.C.'s budget. Thus, in 1971, the F.C.C. was forced to negotiate with 
the White House for its funding after the Office of Management and Budget "temporar-
ily withheld more than a million dollars of the F.C.C.'s budget ...• " !d. at 27. 
398 47 U.S.C. §§ 3.07(d), 312(a). 
399 Bazelon, The First Amendment and the "New Media ": New Directions in Regulating Tele-
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This power is not merely theoretical. Not only did the Nixon 
Administration threaten the licenses of stations which did not 
represent the Administration's views, but there was actually dis-
cussion of attacking the broadcast licenses held by the Washing-
ton Post in retaliation for the newpaper's Watergate 
investigation.40o 
Even in the absence of such obvious abuse of power, there is 
something unseemly about a commission, appointed by or be-
holden to a President, sitting in judgment of the fairness of the 
coverage of that President's re-election campaign. For example, 
in 1964 the F .C.C. ruled that candidate Barry Goldwater did not 
have the right to respond to an address by President Johnson on 
international affairs which was broadcast less than a month 
before the presidential election.401 The Supreme Court declined 
to review this decision over the dissent of Justices Goldberg and 
Black, who said that the limited statutory exceptions to the equal 
time rule "do not appear to apply to the address."402 
In 1979, the F.C.C. was again forced to rule on an incumbent 
President's campaign.403 President Carter's campaign committee 
had sought to purchase time on the three commercial networks 
during December 1979. The networks refused, saying that they 
would sell time to candidates only in the actual year of the elec-
tion. The F.C.C. ruled 4-3 in favor of the President and ordered 
that time be made available to his campaign. One of the dissent-
ing commissioners stated that the ruling "substitutes the Com-
mission's judgment for the broadcaster's own good faith 
interpretation of candidate requests and his response thereto. 
Such governmental intrusion is unwarranted, is illegal and, I fear, 
will come back to haunt the Commission and the public again 
and again. "404 
communications, 31 FED.CoM.LJ. 201, 206 (1979). With some notable exceptions, see infra 
text accompanying notes 406-10, the F.C.C. has generally refrained from even moderate 
oversight of programming decisions. See Fowler & Brenner, supra note 359, at 231 
("[T]he Commission's regulation has rarely been overbearing."). 
400 See Price, supra note 389, at 225, n.47. 
401 Republican National Committee (letter from the F.C.C. to Chairman Dean Burch), 3 
R.R.2d 647 (1964). 
402 Goldwater v. F.C.C. 379 U.S. 893, 895 (1964) (Goldberg,]. dissenting). 
403 In re Complaint of Carter-Mondale Presidential Committee, Inc. against the 
American Broadcasting Company, Columbia Broadcasting System and National Broad-
casting Company Television Networks, 74 F.C.C. 2d 631 (1979), affd sub. nom. Columbia 
Broadcasting System v. F.C.C., 453 U.S. 367 (1981). This case involved the interpreta-
tion of the requirement that stations allow "reasonable access" for federal candidates. 
47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7). 
404 74 F.C.C. 2d at 682 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Washburn). 
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Another potential government intrusion in the arena of polit-
ical speech is the Fairness Doctrine, which requires broadcasters 
to provide adequate time for discussion of public issues and to 
afford a "reasonable opportunity" for contrasting viewpoints.405 
A related rule, the personal attack rule, requires broadcasters to 
afford individuals a "reasonable opportunity" to respond to 
broadcast attacks on their honesty, character or integrity.406 The 
F.C.C. has called for the repeal of these rules, arguing that they 
offend First Amendment values because under them broadcast-
ers can be forced to relinquish valuable air time as a result of the 
content of their programming.407 Conversely, others have con-
tended that these rules should be retained because they protect 
the viewer's First Amendment interest in maintaining a market-
place of ideas and in receiving diverse viewpoints.408 
Again, the U.S. could learn from the French experience. In 
France, the concept of a right to respond to personal attacks in 
broadcasts is considered "necessary for the protection of public 
and private liberty."409 The French right to respond to broad-
casts is basically an extension of the right to respond to the writ-
ten press which was codified in 1881.410 This right, which did not 
require that the government or judiciary rule on the content of 
the newspaper publication before the individual could respond, 
has been hailed in France as "an excellent law which established 
a reasonable balance between the freedom of thought and the 
rights of others."411 
In contrast, the Fairness Doctrine goes against the grain of 
American regulatory tradition, which holds that "liberty of the 
press is in peril as soon as the government tries to compel what is 
405 Broadcast Procedural Manual, 49 F.C.C.2d 1,9-13 (1974). The Fairness Doctrine 
was ratified by Congress in 1959. Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Federal Communi-
cations Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 385 (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 3.15(a». 
406 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1984). The personal attack rule does not apply to most 
statements made about candidates during election campaigns and bona fide news pro-
grams. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920(b). 
407 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking In Re Repeal or Modification of the Personal Attack and 
Political Editorial Rules, 48 Fed. Reg. 28295, 28301 (June 21, 1983). 
408 See e.g. F. ROWAN, BROADCAST FAIRNESS 153 (1984). Accord Red Lion Broadcast-
ing Co., Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367, 390. ("It is the 
right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other 
ideas and experiences which is crucial here."). 
409 Bouissou, supra note 24, at 1196. In France, this right is contained in Art. 6 of 
the Law of July 29, 1982. Supra note 2. 
410 See supra text accompanying notes 137-44. 
411 Toulemon, supra note 100, at 393. Despite the existence ofa right to respond to 
newspaper criticism, "[p]eople exercise this right surprisingly rarely .... " I. POOL, 
supra note 377, at 133. 
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to go into the newspaper."412 Thus, the Supreme Court struck 
down a Florida statute requiring a newspaper to give a political 
candidate equal space to respond to criticism by the paper.413 
The Court ruled that the law unconstitutionally permitted the 
government to intrude into the editorial process of the newspa-
per: "It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation 
of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with the First 
Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to 
this time."414 
The Fairness Doctrine does permit government regulation of 
broadcasters' editorial processes. Justice Douglas argued that it 
"puts the head of the camel inside the tent and enables adminis-
tration after administration to toy with TV or radio in order to 
serve its sordid or its benevolent ends."415 
There is now a new danger of government intrusion into the 
editorial process: the FCC has ruled for the first time that other 
government agencies are to be permitted to file Fairness Doc-
trine complaints alleging that a broadcaster has been unfair to 
them.416 This decision arose out of an F.C.C. ruling on a com-
plaint by the Central Intelligence Agency against a news broad-
cast alleging CIA participation in plots to assassinate American 
citizens.417 Although the CIA's complaint was rejected, it 
presented the unsettling spectacle of a government agency sitting 
in judgment of the truthfulness and fairness of news reporting 
about a sister agency. As the Supreme Court has warned, any 
governmental action which raises "the possibility that a good-
faith critic of government will be penalized. . . strikes at the very 
center of the constitutionally protected area of free expres-
sion."418 The F.C.C. should refuse to hear any complaint by gov-
ernment agencies about reporting on government operations. 
The ability of the government to use its own agency to silence 
412 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 261 (1974) (White, J. 
concurring) (quoting Z. CHAFFEE, 2 GOVERNMENT AND MAss COMMUNICATIONS 633 
(1947». 
413 !d. 
414 !d. 
415 Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 
U.S. 94, 154 (1973) (Douglas, J. concurring). 
416 Complaint of Central Intelligence Agency against American Broadcasting Com-
panies, Inc., Staff Ruling, F.C.C.2d 1 (Jan. 1985). 
417 Jd. 
418 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964) (holding that an "im-
personal attack on governmental operations" cannot be the basis for a libel judgment in 
favor of the government official responsible for the operations.). 
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critics, "because of the restraint it impose[s] upon criticism of 
government and public officials, [is] inconsistent with the First 
Amendment. "419 
It should not be necessary, however, to scrap all regulation of 
broadcasting in order to protect the Commission from political 
influence. One possible solution is suggested by the plan pro-
posed by the Moinot Commission for the H.A.: have the in-
dependent judiciary appoint those who oversee broadcasting.420 
Although this recommendation was not adopted in France, the 
U.S. might consider such an approach. 
Congress does have the constitutional authority to give the 
power of appointment to "the Courts of Law."421 The commis-
sioners could be selected either by the Chief Justice or by a lower 
court, such as the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which already 
has appellate jurisdiction over the F.C.C.422 Those selected as 
commissioners could either be federal judges, protected by life-
time tenure, or others who could be granted that protection. 
Such an appointment system would help insulate the F.C.C. 
from the influence of politicians who are subject both to the 
F.C.Co's regulation and its desire to affect the way their oppo-
nents are regulated. Judicial appointment ofF.C.C. commission-
ers would not be a panacea but, as one French proponent of the 
plan stated, it would ensure "a substantial degree of indepen-
dence from direct political control. "423 
The need for this independence has sometimes been underes-
timated by Americans. For example, Judge David Bazelon has 
observed that this country "has never examined closely the prob-
lem of governmental propaganda. We tend to think that propa-
ganda is confined to communist or fascist dictatorshipso"424 
419 !d. at 276. See also City of Chicago v. Tribune Co., 307 Ill. 595, 610, 139 N.E. 86, 
91 (1923): "[I]t is better that an occasional individual or newspaper that is so perverted 
in judgment and misguided in his or its civic duty should go free than that all. . . citi-
zens should be put in jeopardy of imprisonment or economic subjugation if they venture 
to criticize an inefficient or corrupt government." 
420 See supra text accompanying notes 187-88. 
421 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, d. 2 ("[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appoint-
ment of such. . . Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of 
Law, or in the Heads of Departments.) See also Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371 (1901) (up-
holding power of Congress to confer on district judges the power to appoint extradition 
commissioners). 
422 47 U.S.C. § 402(b). 
423 New Broadcasting Law, supra note 196, at 7. See also R. ELLMORE, supra note 396, at 
26 ("Perhaps extending the term of office for commissioners or giving them the status of 
federal judges would lessen the outside pressures on them."). 
424 Bazelon, supra note 399, at 211. 
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Since the end of World War II, however, the democratically 
elected French goverpment has supervised, influenced and domi-
nated the news and information broadcast over the public service 
channels under its controls. 
The American belief that "it can't happen here" is amply il-
lustrated by the recent Supreme Court decision in F. C. C. v. 
League of Women Voters of Califomia.425 In that case, the Court 
struck down as unconstitutional a law prohibiting noncommercial 
educational broadcasting stations from editorializing if they re-
ceive any funds from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting 
(CPB).426 Despite the fact that the CPB board is appointed by 
the President and that the board disperses federal funds to non-
commercial stations, the Court found adequate legal safeguards 
in the CPB statute which "substantially reduce" the risk of gov-
ernmental interference with the editorial judgment of local sta-
tions.427 Thus, the offending part of the law was an unnecessary 
and superfluous restriction of First Amendment guarantees. In 
examining the legislative history, the Court pointed out that "as 
the House Committee Report frankly admits, [the ban on editori-
alizing] was added not because Congress thought it was essential 
to preserve the autonomy of local stations, but rather 'out of an 
abundance of caution.' "428 
Many of the protections against government interference 
cited by the Court, however, have already been implemented in 
France and have proved incapable of preventing government in-
terference. For example, the first safeguard described by the 
Court is the "bipartisan" nature of the CPB's board of direc-
tors.429 Although the President selects the entire board, there is 
a limit to how many members can come from one party.430 The 
French public service companies, however, are guaranteed even 
greater bipartisan character, as members of both houses of Par-
liament, as well as several other groups, select the boards of 
42.!? 104 S.Ct. 3106 (1984). 
426 The CPB is authorized to "make grants to public telecommunications entities, 
national, regional, and other systems of public telecommunications entities, and in-
dependent producer and production entities, for the production or acquisition of public 
telecommunications services to be made available for use by public telecommunications 
entities .... " 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(2)(B). 
427 F.C.C. v. League of Women Voters of Cali fomi a, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3123. 
428 /d. at 3121 (quoting H.R.Rep. No.572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1967». 
429 /d. at 3122. 
430 47 U.S.C. § 396(c)(I). There are ten members of the Board of Directors, but no 
more than six can come from the same political party. 
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directors.431 
A second safeguard, according to the Court, is the "defined 
objective criteria" for the distribution of funds to local sta-
tions.432 The Prime Minister of France is required to follow 
equally "objective" criteria in allocating funds to the public ser-
vice channels.433 An additional protection cited by the Supreme 
Court is that, according to statute, the CPB is "required to ad-
here strictly to a standard of 'objectivity and balance' in disburs-
ing federal funds to local stations.434 The French public service 
organizations are also required by statute to ensure the "honesty, 
independence and pluralism of information," and to do so "in a 
context of respect for the principles of pluralism and equality be-
tween cultures, beliefs and schools of thought and opinion."435 
One conclusion that can be drawn from the French experi-
ence is that the enumerated safeguards are incapable of guaran-
teeing that a' government can not intervene in communications. 
There are no French counterparts to many of the safeguards 
found in the American public broadcasting system, namely the 
large number of public radio and television stations in America 
and the fact that CPB funds amount to less than one-quarter of 
the total income for these stations.436 These protections do in-
deed help insulate local public broadcasters from undue influ-
ence by the Federal Government. Nonetheless, as Justice 
Stevens noted in his dissent in League of Women Voters: "Congress 
enacted many safeguards because the evil to be avoided was so 
grave."437 The "abundance of caution" described in the House 
431 See supra note 235. The H.A. is also "bipartisan," since three of its members are 
appointed by the President of the Senate, three by the President of the National Assem-
bly, and three by the President of France. See supra text accompanying note 214. Just as 
a majority of the members of the H.A. can come from the political party in power, see 
supra text accompanying notes 303-04, so can a majority of the CPB's Board of Directors 
belong to the same political party as the President who appoints them. 
432 League of Women Voters of California, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3123. The criteria cited 
by the Court leave room for the exercise of discretion by the CPB. For example, the 
CPB's formula for disbursing funds to local public television stations must be designed 
to "provide for the financial needs and requirements of stations in relation to the com-
munities and audiences such stations undertake to serve .... " 47 U.S.C. 
§ 396(k)(6)(B)(i). 
433 The Prime Minister must consider the budget, needs and resources of each pub-
lic service organization. Law of July 29, 1982 supra note 2, art. 63. See also supra notes 
218-19 and accompanying text. 
434 League of Women Voters of California, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3122 (quoting 47 U.S.C. 
§ 3.96(g)(I)(A». 
435 Law of July 29, 1982, supra note 2, art. 5. See supra text accompanying notes 194-
95. 
436 League of Women Voters of California, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3123, n.19. 
437 /d. at 3136 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Report accurately reflects "[t]he quality of the interest in main-
taining government neutrality in the free market of ideas."438 
The current system of public broadcasting creates a danger 
beyond attempts by the Federal government to interfere with a 
free market of ideas. In its present condition, public broadcast-
ing faces the possibility of abuse by state authorities. At least 
two-thirds of the public broadcasting licensees are directly tied to 
state and local government, either through state public broad-
casting authorities appointed by the governor, state universities 
and educational commissions, local school boards or municipal 
authorities.439 These stations, controlled by local government, 
also have the power to slant news coverage. For example, in 
1981, a New Jersey programming authority, funded in large part 
by the State Legislature, decided to present a debate among the 
leading gubernatorial candidates running in the primary elec-
tion.440 Because 21 candidates were running, the authority de-
cided to limit the debate to only those ten with the best chance of 
winning. While the New Jersey Supreme Court eventually up-
held the New Jersey programming authority's action as a legiti-
mate exercise of editorial discretion,441 the incident shows how 
easily a state programming agency can become involved in a state 
election in which the government appointees running the agency 
may well have had more than a passive interest. 
The Supreme Court has not yet promulgated a standard for 
evaluating the constitutionality of editorial decisions made by 
governmental station operators. In one of its last en bane deci-
sions before being divided into two circuits,442 the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appe~s offered such a standard whereby the govern-
438 !d. at 3133 (Stevens. j., dissenting). A recent decision of the Supreme Court 
reflecting this "quality of interest" is Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota 
Commissioner of Revenue, 103 S.Ct. 1365 (1983). In that case, the Court struck down a 
special tax on newspapers without a showing of an improper legislative motive or even 
that newspapers would be forced to pay a higher tax than other businesses. The Court 
warned that "the very selection of the press for special treatment threatens the press not 
only with the current differential treatment, but with the possibility of subsequent, differ-
entially more burdensome treatment. Thus, even without actually imposing an extra bur-
den on the press, the government might be able to achieve censorial effects .... " 103 
S.Ct. 1365, 1374 (emphasis in original). 
439 League of Women Voters of California, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3125, n.22. 
440 McGlynn v. New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority, 88 NJ. 112,439 A.2d 54 
(1981). 
441 !d. 
442 The Fifth Circuit was divided into the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits as of October 
1, 1981. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub.L.No.96-452, 
94 Stat.1994 (1980). The judges of the circuits, though, were to treat all cases under 
consideration at that time as if the circuit had not been divided. 
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ment television operators had the "same rights and obligations 
to make free programming decisions as their private 
counterparts. "443 
The Fifth Circuit decision upheld the actions of two state 
agencies in reversing initial staff decisions to show a program en-
titled "Death of a Princess." The show, which dealt with the "ex-
ecution for adultery of a Saudi Arabian princess and her 
commoner lover," was rejected by the two stations out of fear of 
the reaction of the Saudi government.444 The court denied that 
this rejection was censorship in violation of the First Amend-
ment: "A general proscription against political programming de-
cisions would clearly be contrary to the licensee's statutory 
obligations, and would render virtually every programming deci-
sion subject to judicial challenge."445 The court concluded that 
the proper remedy was to be found with the F.C.C., which was 
empowered to decide whether the programs of all broadcasters, 
private or governmental, met the minimum standards of fairness 
required by the Communications Act.446 
As one of the dissenting opinions points out, however, the 
F.C.C. will defer to the discretion of its licensees in all but ex-
treme cases: "Because the FCC does not distinguish between 
private and public broadcasters in its regulation of the ainvaves, 
it provides no protection from the kind of state censorship al-
leged in these cases."447 Another dissenting judge proposed a 
reasonable test for evaluating editorial decisions of public broad-
casters. Under this test, a government programmer who decided 
whether to present a program based not on its content and 
"value" but on the agreement or disagreement of the govern-
ment with its viewpoint, would be held to violate "the First 
Amendment requirement of neutrality."448 
Absent this neutrality, the "intrusive editorial thumb of Gov-
443 Muir v. Alabama Educational Television Commission, 688 F.2d 1033, 1041 
(1982), ccrt. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983). One station, run by the Alabama Educational 
Television Commission, was largely funded through state legislative appropriations. 
The other station was run by a public university, the University of Houston. 
444 !d., 688 F.2d at 1036. The University of Houston official who decided not to run 
the program issued a press release explaining that the program was canceled because of 
"strong and understandable objections by the government of Saudi Arabia at a time 
when the mounting crisis in the Middle East, our long friendship with the Saudi govern-
ment and the U.S. national interests all point to the need to avoid exacerbating the 
situation." Id. at 1037. 
445 Id. at 1044. 
446 Id. at 1047. 
447 Id. at 1056-57 (Johnson, j., dissenting)(citations omitted). 
448 Id. at 1060 (Reavely, J., dissenting). 
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ernment," at both the federal and local levels, could be felt in the 
United States as it has been in France.449 There would be an 
ever-present danger that "pro-government views that are not ac-
tually shared by [the broadcaster] will be parrotted to curry favor 
with its benefactor," the government.450 The possibility would 
exist that all news coverage would be slanted by "the insidious 
evils of government propaganda favoring particular points of 
view."451 
Thus, the ultimate lesson for Americans to learn from France 
may be that, while government needs to play a critical role in 
establishing a diversified and pluralistic system of communica-
tions, every precaution must be taken to ensure that government 
is never given the chance to reward and punish speakers for 
statements which please or annoy those in power. We must al-
ways protect what Justice Stevens terms "the overriding interest 
in forestalling the creation of propaganda organs for the 
Government. "452 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The regulation of mass communications poses unique risks 
and dangers. What is being regulated is not the simple sale of 
goods and services but the dissemination of information to the 
public.453 With too little government supervision, small groups 
may come to monopolize the primary means of communication 
449 Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 
145 (Stewart,j., concurring). The majority in League of Women Voters o/California noted 
that another area where the Government potentially can intrude in public broadcasting 
is the programs funded directly by the CPB: "Such programs truly have the potential to 
reach a large audience and, because of the critical commentary they contain, to have the 
kind of genuine national impact that might trigger a congressional response or kindle 
governmental resentment." 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3124. The Court noted that when President 
Nixon vetoed a bill involving CPB funding, "the Administration was critical of certain of 
the best-known nationally distributed public affairs programs, such as 'Bill Moyer'sjour-
nal' and 'Washington Week in Review,' which were regarded as too controversial." /d. 
n.21. 
450 League of Women Voters of California, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 3137, n.11 (Stevens,j., 
dissenting). 
451 /d. at 3133 (Stevens,j., dissenting). 
452 /d. at 3138 (Stevens,j., dissenting). 
453 As justice Frankfurter wrote, the press "has a relation to the public interest un-
like that of any other enterprise pursued for profit. A free press is indispensable to the 
workings of our democratic society. The business of the press ... is the promotion of 
truth regarding public matters by furnishing the basis for an understanding of them. 
Truth and understanding are not wares like peanuts or potatoes. . . . The interest of 
the public is to have the flow of news not trammeled by the combined self-interest of 
those who enjoy a unique constitutional position precisely because of the public depen-
dence on a free press. A public interest so essential to the vitality of our democratic 
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and, thus, the agenda and substance of the discussion of issues of 
public importance. Without adequate safeguards, however, the 
government itself may be able to influence or control the content 
of public debate. 
The history of France's audiovisual communications law may 
guide those in the United State to possible solutions to this quan-
dary. Most important, understanding the French experience 
gives new appreciation to not only the difficulty, but also the ne-
cessity, of properly defining, structuring and limiting the role of 
government in regulating the electronic media. 
government may be defeated by private restraints no less than by public censorship." 
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, at 28-29 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
